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Abstract
Improving Surveillance of Emerging RNA Viruses
Mary E. Petrone
2021
Effective surveillance of emerging RNA viruses is essential for public health and
epidemiological research. Without identifying incident infections in an actionable time
frame, the prevention of future infections becomes nearly impossible. This was
exemplified at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, during
which time only a small fraction of infected individuals was detected through
surveillance, and the virus promptly spread across the country. Similarly, parameterizing
informative epidemiological models requires accurate data. In the absence of effective
surveillance and/or a clear understanding of where gaps in the system exist, efforts to
better understand the dynamics of circulating viruses become misguided or futile.
Major challenges to improving surveillance methods are (1) the inherent
interdisciplinary nature of the field and (2) limited available resources. Molecular drivers
including host-pathogen interactions and pathogen evolution influence the burden of
disease and the changing effectiveness of diagnostic tools used to detect new infections.
For example, syndromic surveillance systems used in dengue-endemic regions
disproportionately detect individuals experiencing secondary dengue infections.
Statistical methods may be useful for inferring information that would otherwise be
unobservable in such cases, and obtaining community buy-in is essential for ensuring
the success of any surveillance program. To further investigate these challenges, we

characterize surveillance gaps in arbovirus surveillance systems in the Dominican
Republic and propose some solutions for closing these gaps in Chapter 1. Because
implementing these solutions becomes increasingly difficult in resource-limited settings,
we next develop systems that utilize low-cost components. We first validate the use of
saliva as a diagnostic medium for SARS-CoV-2 testing. Compared to nasopharyngeal
swabs, saliva collection is less invasive and is less affected by clinical supply-chain
bottlenecks, which mitigates fluctuations in the cost of consumables. In Chapter 2, we
evaluate the safety and effectiveness of unobserved saliva self-collection and find that
participants were able to provide saliva samples for diagnostic testing without difficulty.
By increasing access to diagnostic testing, we aim to build sustainable surveillance
systems and promote health equity.
The expanding scale of available genomic data, particularly in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic, has also helped address some surveillance gaps and provided
important insights into the emergence and spread of novel RNA viruses. When a viral
population is sampled at sufficient density, it is possible to answer key epidemiological
questions such as when and from where the virus was introduced into a community. In
Chapter 3, we use phylogenetics and genomic epidemiology to demonstrate that the
initial COVID-19 outbreak in Connecticut was likely caused by domestic spread of
SARS-CoV-2. This discovery highlighted surveillance gaps in the early COVID-19
response in the United States, which assumed that incident cases were associated with
international travel at that time. Since then, the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic has
prompted more complex questions, especially in response to the emergence of more
transmissible variants. Thus, in Chapter 4, we develop a framework that combines
genomic and traditional epidemiological data and compares the relative fitness of cocirculating SARS-CoV-2 variants. We specifically designed this framework for routine
implementation by minimizing the requisite computational demands and run time.

In this dissertation, we identify and address key challenges associated with the
improvement of surveillance systems for RNA viruses of public health significance.
Specifically, we use a case study in the Dominican Republic to demonstrate the risks
associated with relying on syndromic surveillance and surveillance systems closely tied
to initial outbreaks of emerging viruses. We then propose practical solutions for closing
surveillance gaps using low-cost and genomic methods. In sum, we argue that
sustainable rather than reactionary surveillance systems promote public health, and we
provide feasible methods for facilitating this transition.
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Introduction
Introduction of challenges and advances in surveillance methods for RNA
viruses

1. Closing the gaps in the surveillance of emerging and re-emerging viruses
Ascertaining the true number of infections during a viral outbreak is rarely
possible, which poses a serious threat to the health of affected communities. Emerging
and re-emerging viruses are generally detected once a significant number of individuals
become seriously ill from the same causative agent. As evidenced by SARS-CoV-2 and
the pandemic it precipitated, this strategy is insufficient for preventing major outbreaks if
the symptoms many infected individuals experience are mild or similar to those caused
by known pathogens. This problem is exacerbated in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) in South and Central America, where a myriad of mosquito-borne viruses can
cause febrile illness in children but mild to no symptoms in adults[1–3]. As a result,
syndromic surveillance systems cannot distinguish between endemic viruses such as
dengue and emerging threats such as Zika and chikungunya until new health outcomes
are realized. For example, the discovery that Zika virus can cause severe defects in
newborns did not occur until a large number of expecting mothers were already
infected[4]. Moreover, these systems do not detect periods in which cryptic viral
transmission is occurring, which may also place communities at risk. The abrupt
resurgence of dengue in the Americas in 2018-19 highlights the dangers of these blind
spots[5].
In the absence of broader diagnostic testing strategies, which require robust
public health infrastructures currently unavailable in many LMICs, creative alternatives
for inferring the true burden of infection are necessary. To this end, mathematical and
statistical models that use the reported number of deaths may prove more reliable when
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it can be assumed that deaths are well-reported[6,7]. When reliable reporting systems
are unavailable, environmental surveillance may be used to fill in the gaps. For example,
concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in wastewater correlate with local incidence in
some populations[8], and this approach could be applied to monitor other respiratory and
gastro-intestinal viruses. For mosquito-borne and zoonotic viruses, genomic surveillance
targeting vector and reservoir populations may be used to estimate infection prevalence
among hosts[9–12]. Developing a multi-faceted surveillance toolkit is essential for
preventing future viral outbreaks and pandemics because every population faces unique
public health challenges. Effective surveillance efforts will be those that can be sustained
during the interim periods between major outbreaks.

2. Equitable implementation of community-based surveillance
Even with the increasing availability of alternative surveillance methods,
collecting a sufficient, minimally biased dataset from any target population remains a
pervasive challenge in epidemiological research. A major barrier to eliminating this bias
is improving diagnostic testing strategies, which dictate which clinical samples are
collected. Exceedingly narrow testing criteria in the United States at the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic hampered efforts to detect community transmission on the west
coast[13]. Even after the stringency of these criteria were relaxed, supply chain
bottlenecks for testing equipment, high costs associated with diagnostic tests, and
limited accessibility to healthcare facilities contributed to persistent testing biases[14].
Reducing barriers to diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV-2 and other epidemiologically
relevant pathogens is not only critical for improving health equity, it is also necessary for
developing robust surveillance systems.
A sustainable diagnostic sampling framework should incorporate flexible sample
collection platforms and limit financial barriers for participants. Nasopharyngeal swabs
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have been considered the gold standard for respiratory pathogen detection, but this
sample collection is invasive and must be performed by a trained healthcare worker[15–
17]. Moreover, only one type of collection medium (the swab) may be used for sample
collection. The validation of saliva as an equally sensitive substrate for SARS-CoV-2
diagnostic testing dramatically increased the variety of potential sample collection
methods[15]. A low-cost PCR test designed for SARS-CoV-2 detection in saliva,
SalivaDirectTM, further reduced the financial burden associated with saliva-based
diagnostic testing[17], and an additional PCR assay designed to detect SARS-CoV-2
Variants of Concern provided a less expensive alternative to genomic sequencing[18].
Together with these technologies, increasing accessibility to diagnostic testing by
validating the collection of saliva in homes, businesses, and schools will further reduce
surveillance gaps.

3. Scaling up genomic epidemiology in response to viral epidemics
Microbial genomic data have served as an integral part of outbreak investigations
for decades. Genomic data are routinely used to identify and trace the source of
foodborne illnesses on local, state, and national levels[19]. Applications of genomic
epidemiology have helped to mitigate the threat posed by the emergence of
antimicrobial resistance in the human microbiome [20] and among livestock[21,22]. The
increasing availability of affordable sequencing technologies has significantly improved
the resolution at which the spread of human infectious pathogens may be tracked [23].
In particular, genomic analyses of Mycobacterium tuberculosis have proved especially
important for monitoring the transmission of drug resistant bacterial strains and
developing new treatment options for those who become infected[24,25]. Phylogenetic
analyses of RNA viruses have enabled researchers to reconstruct HIV transmission
chains[26–29] and identify the sources and monitor the global spread of influenza

3

outbreaks in humans and animals[30,31]. Together, these efforts have paved the way for
new applications of pathogen genomic research and continue to play a critical role in
public health practice.
The scale of genomic epidemiological investigations significantly increased in
response to the West Africa Ebola and Zika epidemics in 2014-2016 and 2016-2017,
respectively. RNA viruses, such as Ebola and Zika, are particularly conducive for largescale phylogenetic analyses because of the small size of their genomes and the short
timescale over which they evolve. Moreover, the falling costs of sequencing and the
invention of the Nanopore MinION in 2014 made it possible for researchers to routinely
sequence viruses in the field for the first time[32]. During both the Ebola and Zika
epidemics, responders used the MinION, which can generate whole viral genomes
within hours, to establish mobile sequencing laboratories where they rapidly sequenced
viruses isolated from clinical samples[33–36]. At the same time, advances in highthroughput sequencing technologies enabled researchers to sequence a large portion of
known infections[37,38]. With these combined data, epidemiologists were able to map
patterns of viral spread[34,39]), identify plausible transmission routes[36–38,40], and
characterize novel evolutionary features that could impact pharmaceutical
interventions[41]. The rate and granularity at which cases were sequenced during both
epidemics signaled the modern advent of virus genomic epidemiology.
The magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic further expanded the scope of viral
genomic research. Metagenomic sequencing identified SARS-CoV-2 as the causative
agent of a mysterious pneumonia-like illness first reported in Wuhan, Hubei, China in
late 2019[42], and genomic epidemiological investigations began in China and Hong
Kong to trace the spread of the virus and identify potential zoonotic hosts shortly
thereafter[43–46]. By March, sufficient genomic data were publicly available to
distinguish between international introductions and community transmission in the
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Americas and Europe[13,47–49]. Academic and government stakeholders quickly
became motivated to invest in large-scale genomic epidemiology systems. The COVID19 Genomics UK Consortium (COG-UK) was created in April 2020 with a budget of £20
million (https://www.cogconsortium.uk), while in the United States, the Biden
Administration announced a $1.7 billion plan to combat new variants, allocating $400
million for the launch of six Centers of Excellence in Genomic Epidemiology[50]. As a
testament to these efforts and those of researchers around the world, an unprecedented
volume of genomic data were generated, with millions of whole SARS-CoV-2 genomes
made freely and publicly available within the first 18 months of the pandemic
(gisaid.org). These data have made a significant impact on public policy by informing
decisions to impose travel restrictions, social distancing mandates, and vaccine
requirements[51,52].

4. Developing genomic surveillance infrastructures and analytical methods
As the scale and duration of the COVID-19 pandemic increased, so too did the
applications of genomic epidemiology. During the first year of the pandemic, genomic
data were primarily used in the same way as they had been in response to Ebola and
Zika: determining when and from where the virus infiltrated communities[53–56].
Mutations were generally regarded as informative data points for tracking the global
spread of SARS-CoV-2 as opposed to a cause for concern[57], and phylogenetics was
the primary mode of analysis. The emergence of novel ‘Variants of Concern’ (VOCs) at
the end of 2020 shifted this paradigm[58–62]. These variants contained mutations that
were associated with increased transmissibility and/or immune escape[63–66]. Thus, in
addition to revealing patterns of spread, the composition of SARS-CoV-2 populations
bore key epidemiological and clinical implications. National and local governments
responded by incorporating systems for routinely monitoring the frequency of VOCs into
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previously established sequencing infrastructures[67–69]. This practice, known as
genomic surveillance, aims to assess the contagiousness of circulating variants, detect
potentially dangerous variants before they spread globally, and assess vaccine
effectiveness. Robust genomic surveillance will likely become crucial in mitigating severe
illness and death as the world’s leading economies attempt to return to pre-pandemic
activities.
Shifting objectives for genomic data collection have also motivated efforts to
develop computational methods that measure the fitness of emerging variants.
Accurately comparing two variants necessitates that the epidemiological context in which
they spread is controlled because this context heavily influences measurable facets of
viral fitness. This presents a major analytical challenge because VOCs emerge at
different times, in various locations, and within uniquely composed virus populations.
Thus, outside of naturally controlled settings, comparative studies may be limited in their
generalizability. For example, Volz et al., estimated that the effective reproduction
number of Alpha was higher than that of non-VOCs circulating in England[66], while an
analysis of clinical outcomes among vaccinated individuals in New York City assuaged
concerns that the Variant of Interest B.1.526 (‘Iota’) was more transmissible among New
Yorkers when compared with other lineages[62]. Although these studies advance our
understanding of emerging variants, they focus on individual settings and do not provide
methods that could be applied universally. Therefore, there is a persistent need to
develop flexible tools that unify genomic and epidemiological data and accurately
capture the relative fitness of individual variants.
As the world looks beyond COVID-19, a growing body of research suggests that
genomic surveillance may be used to prevent future pandemics, but implementing this
strategy will require careful consideration of where and when it would be most
informative[70]. Advocates of preventative genomic surveillance suggest that
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sequencing efforts should be targeted to regions in which zoonotic spillover is most
likely[70,71]. However, mathematical models lack resolution on this question, indicating
that large swaths of the planet, particularly in Asia, are vulnerable to spillover events[71].
Moreover, if surveillance is to primarily target zoonotic reservoirs, distinguishing between
benign and true threats will require a deeper understanding of the mechanisms that
cause viruses to spillover into humans[72]. The massive size of the vertebrate
virosphere precludes a comprehensive investigation of every newly discovered zoonotic
virus[73,74]. As a solution, Geoghegen & Holmes have proposed that only individuals
who are at the highest risk of contracting a zoonotic virus, such as those who work
directly with wild animals or their meat, engage in routine surveillance[75]. While this
strategy would reserve investigative efforts for viruses that are able to infect humans, it
might prove challenging to implement because high-risk individuals may also be the
hardest to collect samples from. Regardless, it is improbable that successful global
genomic surveillance strategies will comprise a single, ubiquitous framework. Rather,
tailored systems that prioritize public health risks within individual communities and
supplement traditional surveillance systems are likely to have the greatest positive
impact on future disease control and prevention.

5. Conclusion
In the first half of this dissertation, we highlight the challenges of implementing
routine surveillance in response to viral epidemics. We first investigate the timing and
spatial distribution of dengue, chikungunya, and Zika outbreaks that were reported in the
Dominican Republic between 2012 and 2018 (Chapter 1). We find that spread of the
emerging viruses (chikungunya and Zika) occurred earlier in the year compared to that
of dengue, which is endemic to the region, despite being transmitted by the same
mosquito vector. Moreover, while the spatiotemporal dynamics of province-level dengue
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outbreaks were consistent between outbreaks, they were not predictive of those
dynamics for emerging viral outbreaks. We hypothesize that national-level changes in
case reporting and reliance on syndromic surveillance throughout this time period
contributed to these discrepancies. Monitoring the virus population in mosquito vectors
using genomic surveillance could significantly mitigate this problem. We next advocate
for reducing barriers to sample collection and diagnostic testing (Chapter 2). In this
chapter, we demonstrate that clinical samples may be safely self-collected outside of
traditional healthcare settings using generic, inexpensive collection devices. Though this
study focuses on diagnostic testing for COVID-19, it provides a proof-of-concept that
may be applied to other diseases, thereby improving surveillance systems and reducing
health inequities.
We develop a framework for conducting genomic surveillance in response to
public health crises in the second half of this dissertation. We begin by coupling genomic
and epidemiological data to investigate the origins of the first COVID-19 outbreak in
Connecticut (Chapter 3). In this chapter, we supplement evidence from our phylogenetic
analysis with mathematical modelling to demonstrate that inter-state spread of SARSCoV-2 was occurring shortly after the virus was detected in the United States. We next
developed a method that integrates genomic and epidemiological data to measure the
relative fitness of circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants (Chapter 4). Unlike our approach in
the previous chapter, which considers genomic and epidemiological evidence in parallel,
we use genomic data as an input for variant-specific effective reproduction number
estimates. We use the Alpha and Iota variants, which co-emerged in New Haven,
Connecticut, at the beginning of 2021, as a case study and find that Alpha was 6-10%
times more transmissible than Iota. This method was designed for routine genomic
surveillance, utilizing open-source computational tools and minimizing the computational
expense required to execute it.
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ABSTRACT
Mosquito-borne viruses threaten the Caribbean due to the region’s tropical climate and
seasonal reception of international tourists. Outbreaks of chikungunya and Zika have
demonstrated the rapidity with which these viruses can spread. Concurrently, dengue
fever cases have climbed over the past decade. Sustainable disease control measures
are urgently needed to quell virus transmission and prevent future outbreaks. Here, to
improve upon current control methods, we analyze temporal and spatial patterns of
chikungunya, Zika, and dengue outbreaks reported in the Dominican Republic between
2012 and 2018. The viruses that cause these outbreaks are transmitted
by Aedes mosquitoes, which are sensitive to seasonal climatological variability. We
evaluate whether climate and the spatio-temporal dynamics of dengue outbreaks could
explain patterns of emerging disease outbreaks. We find that emerging disease
outbreaks were robust to the climatological and spatio-temporal constraints defining
seasonal dengue outbreak dynamics, indicating that constant surveillance is required to
prevent future health crises.
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INTRODUCTION
Emerging and endemic mosquito-borne viruses are a constant public health
concern in the Caribbean

1–3

. This region is especially vulnerable to the spread of the

former due to its tropical climate and large tourism industry, which attracts visitors from all
across the globe. The recent outbreaks of chikungunya

4–6

and Zika 7–9 in 2014 and 2016,

respectively, demonstrated that viruses once associated with mild illness can re-emerge
and cause devastating health outcomes. Reports that Mayaro virus, which has already
been detected in the Caribbean, can be transmitted by the urbanized mosquito species
Aedes indicate that future outbreaks of emerging mosquito-borne diseases may be on the
horizon

10–14

. In addition to this threat, dengue virus is endemic to many Caribbean

countries and territories and has caused outbreaks with increased frequency over the past
decade. Large outbreaks, which began in 2019 but have continued through 2020

15

,

extend an alarming trend of a rising number of dengue cases reported annually in the
Americas in recent years 16. However, the danger of these viruses and the diseases they
cause lie not only in their debilitating and sometimes life-threatening symptoms. The
unpredictability of when and where a new outbreak will occur precludes preparedness.
Outbreak response strategies are inherently reactionary and, in their transience, disrupt
public health systems when new initiatives are introduced and subsequently phased out.
This is especially problematic in resource-limited settings where the strategic allocation of
resources should be prioritized to maximize the impact of disease control efforts. New
approaches centered around sustainable, long-term surveillance are needed to curtail the
potential for future public health crises in the Caribbean.
One such approach is the use of climate data to evaluate the risk of viral spread.
The transmission of mosquito-borne viruses, both emerging and endemic, should adhere
to similar temporal and spatial patterns such that the dynamics of past outbreaks can
inform those of future outbreaks. Many flaviviruses, like dengue and Zika viruses, and
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alphaviruses, like chikungunya virus, are transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes, which are
sensitive to climatological variability

17–19

. Temporal concordance between seasonal

weather patterns and transmission of yellow fever virus (flavivirus) has been documented
on the African continent

20

. Similar associations have been reported for dengue fever

incidence in Hanoi, Vietnam and in Myanmar 21,22 and for chikungunya and Zika incidence
in the Americas

17

. However, there is evidence to suggest that this relationship does not

extend to the transmission dynamics of viruses during their first year of introduction into a
new population

23,24

. Therefore, we considered whether, while climate may be a useful

indicator for future endemic virus outbreaks, other factors including population size,
demographics, and the timing of introduction should be considered when developing
strategies to prevent future emerging disease outbreaks.
To answer these questions in the context of the Caribbean, we analyzed dengue,
chikungunya, and Zika cases reported daily in the Dominican Republic between 2012 and
2018. We found that emerging disease outbreaks (chikungunya and Zika) occurred earlier
in the year than dengue outbreaks, and the timing and location of introductions of
emerging viruses impacted when and where corresponding outbreaks occurred.
Moreover, the spread of chikungunya and Zika viruses was tolerant to suboptimal climates
for transmission by Aedes mosquitoes, likely due to the large size of the susceptible
human population. Predicted mosquito abundance was similarly uninformative for the
spatial distribution of emerging disease attack rates and force of infection. Moreover,
provincial-level dengue attack rates were consistent between dengue outbreaks, but they
did not correspond to local attack rates of chikungunya and Zika. Taken together, we
demonstrate that dengue virus may not always be an appropriate model to prepare for
future emerging mosquito-borne disease outbreaks. Instead, a sustainable and long-term
mosquito-borne disease surveillance system is needed to facilitate proactive responses
to emerging threats and to track the continued spread of known diseases including
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dengue, chikungunya, and Zika. We specifically propose the use of two indicators,
incidence of febrile illness cases and dengue case fatality rates, to monitor surveillance
performance and identify potential emerging threats.
RESULTS
Multiple endemic and emerging mosquito-borne virus outbreaks in the Dominican
Republic
Between 2012 and 2018, the Dominican Republic, a country that shares the
Caribbean island La Hispaniola with Haiti (Fig. 1a), experienced five disease outbreaks
caused by mosquito-borne viruses (Fig. 1b,c). We delineated this period into six seasons
(Seasons 1-6), each beginning in April of every year between 2012 - 2018, coincident with
the start of the rainy season. Three of the five outbreaks were caused by dengue virus
(Seasons 1, 2, and 4; Fig. 1b,c). Sufficient serosurvey data for the Dominican Republic
are not available to determine the predominant dengue virus serotype(s) during each
outbreak, but the Pan-American Health Organization reports that serotypes 1, 2, and 4
were prevalent in the Caribbean between 2012 and 2014, and serotypes 2, 3, and 4 were
circulating in the region in 2015

25

. The other two outbreaks were caused by emerging

viruses, chikungunya and Zika (Seasons 3 and 5, respectively; Fig. 1b,c)

26

. Those

outbreaks were the first and only to be reported of either disease in the country, and the
number of reported cases in the Caribbean as a whole plummeted in subsequent years
27,28

. After the season dominated by Zika virus (Season 5), only a small number of dengue

cases were diagnosed (Season 6).
Clinical and demographic characteristics differed between reported dengue,
chikungunya, and Zika cases. The majority of dengue cases experienced fever (98.3%),
were hospitalized for their condition (93.7%), and were between the ages of 0 and 15
(62.3%), suggesting immunity in the adult population (Table 1). Patients diagnosed with
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chikungunya and Zika were older and predominantly female. Rash and/or arthralgia in
conjunction with fever are typical clinical manifestations of chikungunya and Zika
infections

29–34

. Although lower than rates reported elsewhere, arthralgia rates among

chikungunya cases in our dataset were consistent with previously documented rates
among individuals diagnosed with chikungunya in the Dominican Republic

34

.

Table 1: Epidemiological and clinical characteristics of cases
Season and
Disease

Year

Number
of Cases

Median
Age of
Cases
(IQR)

%
Hospitalized

%
Female

%
Reported
Fever

%
Reported
Rash

%
Reported
Arthralgia

Season 1
(dengue)*

20122013

13,666

11 (11)

94.3

44.0

98.7

15.0

31.0

Season 2
(dengue)*

20132014

15,079

11 (11)

92.9

46.3

97.4

5.6

16.4

Season 3
(dengue)

20142015

5,236

13 (18)

88.7

45.0

96.1

8.0

23.2

Season 4
(dengue)*

20152016

19,619

12 (13)

93.9

46.0

98.9

4.0

17.6

Season 5
(dengue)

20162017

3,093

15 (25)

85.5

42.4

98.1

7.1

24.9

Season 6
(dengue)

20172018

1,437

18 (24)

87.3**

38.5

98.3

4.0

27.4

Chikungunya

2014

6,461

28 (32)

32.0

60.8

89.5

26.0

63.0

Zika

2016

5,161

30 (21)

16.1

73.9

74.2

70.7

8.5

IQR: interquartile range
* Outbreak reported
** The type of medical attention received by 22.9% of the reported cases during this
period was not reported and was assumed to be hospital admissions
Chikungunya and Zika outbreak dynamics did not conform to seasonal dengue
patterns
Implementing effective disease prevention and control measures requires
knowledge of when their etiological viruses are most likely to emerge, re-emerge, and
spread 35. Dengue, chikungunya, and Zika are caused by RNA viruses transmitted by the
mosquito vectors Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus. The abundance and capacity of
these vectors are sensitive to climatological factors including temperature, rainfall, and
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humidity
kind

19,36

17,20–23

, such that transmission of all three viruses has been shown to fluctuate in

. We therefore hypothesized that the timing of the five outbreaks should

concord with seasonal weather patterns.
We found that the emerging disease outbreaks (chikungunya [Season 3] and Zika
[Season 5]) occurred earlier in the year compared to endemic outbreaks (dengue). The
chikungunya and Zika outbreaks peaked 15 and 26 weeks earlier, respectively, than the
averaged dengue peak (epidemiological week 41; Fig. 1b). While both chikungunya and
dengue cases began to rise around epidemiological week 15, a rise in Zika cases was
observed during the first weeks of the year.
Because the implementation of national-level reporting of chikungunya and Zika
cases influenced when these outbreaks were detected (Fig 1c, arrows), we calculated
the number of weeks elapsed between the first reported case of each outbreak and the
peak number of cases within provinces (Fig. 1d). We assumed that climatological factors
did not vary widely between provinces during a given season. Our reasoning followed
that the rate of viral transmission is limited by the extrinsic incubation period (EIP) of the
virus in the mosquito vector 37, and the EIP for Aedes mosquitoes is mainly influenced by
temperature 38–40. Therefore, because we did not expect transmission rates to vary widely
between provinces, provincial outbreaks that peaked soon after the reporting system was
implemented would indicate that transmission in those provinces preceded the
establishment of this system.
Our analysis identified one such instance. The majority of provincial chikungunya
and Zika outbreaks peaked within 12 and 25 weeks, and the mean time to peak across
provinces did not significantly differ (Fig. 1d,e). This was in contrast to the substantial
heterogeneity of the timing of the three dengue outbreaks. The lack of uniformity across
these outbreaks may have been due to a slower rate of spread between regions because
of a pre-existing and spatially heterogeneous herd immunity landscape. Five provinces,
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four of which are located in the south-western part of the country, reported peak numbers
of Zika cases in January and February of 2016 (Fig. 1d). For the reasons stated above
and because Zika virus had been circulating in the Americas for at least two years before
it was reported in the Dominican Republic

7,41

, this observation suggested that Zika virus

was already circulating in those provinces before the national reporting system was
implemented at the beginning of January. We hypothesized that early Zika virus
transmission could have occurred in the south-western region because of the region’s
proximity to Haiti. In particular, this region shares a border with Haiti, is connected to the
Haitian capital Port-au-Prince via a major roadway, and is home to a large binational
market (Fig. 1e, map, star). A temporal comparison of the Zika outbreaks reported in this
region, the rest of the country, and Haiti revealed that the regional outbreak was more
consistent with the 2016 Zika outbreak reported in Haiti (Fig. 1e, inset). Moreover, the
proportion of dengue cases reporting a rash was larger and peaked earlier in the southwestern region Enriquillo in 2016 compared to the rest of the country (Supplementary
Figure 1). This suggests that some Zika cases may have been misclassified as dengue
at the beginning of the outbreak. These findings indicate that the Dominican Republic
experienced two geographically and temporally distinct Zika outbreaks. From reported
case counts alone we cannot conclude whether Zika virus was introduced into the
Dominican Republic from Haiti or vice versa; however, it is clear that binational
coordination is an essential component of local mosquito-borne disease control because
the viruses these vectors transmit do not recognize international borders.
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Figure 1: Two outbreaks of emerging disease, chikungunya and Zika, and three
endemic dengue outbreaks were reported between 2012 and 2018 in the Dominican
Republic. (a) The Dominican Republic is a country in the Caribbean that shares the island
of La Hispaniola with Haiti. Map source (grey): Free Vector Maps. (b) Cases in the
Dominican Republic reported by the Ministry of Health during each outbreak per
epidemiological week for five seasons. (c) Weekly reported cases from 2012-2018. Arrows
indicate when the first and last cases were reported for emerging pathogens. (d) Number
of weeks elapsed between the first case reported nationally and peak cases reported in
32 provinces (each data point represents a different province). The chikungunya outbreak
began during epidemiological week (EW) 6, the Zika outbreak during EW 1, and the three
dengue outbreaks during EW 14. The mean time to peak for each outbreak were
compared using ordinary one-way ANOVA. We adjusted for multiple comparisons using
Tukey’s multiple comparisons test. The qualitative statistical result of the analysis did not
change when the five early Zika provinces were excluded. Symbols: ‘ns’ indicates p-value
> 0.05, * indicates p ≤ 0.05, horizontal bars indicate the median time to peak for each
outbreak. D(S1) vs D(S2): p < 0.0001; D(S1) vs D(S4): p = 0.0155; D(S2) vs D(S4): p =
0.0173; C vs Z: p = 0.9885. (e) Geographic and temporal comparisons of Zika cases
reported by four provinces in the south-western region of the Dominican Republic. A major
roadway connects the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince to the southwestern region of the
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Dominican Republic (blue line, map) and Santo Domingo, the national capital. A large
binational market is located in the province Pedernales (star, map). Similar to Haiti,
provinces in the southwest experienced an earlier outbreak of Zika compared to the
remaining 28 provinces (inset).

Initial outbreaks of emerging mosquito-borne diseases can occur during periods of
sub-optimal climatological conditions
Having observed that the emerging disease outbreaks peaked earlier in the year
than the three dengue outbreaks (Fig. 1), we considered two possible explanations. (1)
Either climate patterns differed between seasons and the emerging outbreaks preceded
those of dengue due to seasonal stochasticity, or (2) the spread of emerging viruses was
less sensitive to climatological factors compared to dengue virus. By analyzing daily
climatological data collected over the duration of our study period, we found support for
the latter (Fig. 2).
To investigate the relationship between climate and case incidence, we used
temperature and humidity time series data to estimate the mosquito-borne transmission
potential throughout our study period (Fig. 2). For this analysis, we used Index P, a metric
that is calculated by incorporating climate and entomological data into a Bayesian
framework to estimate the transmission potential of individual female mosquitoes

17

. We

calculated transmission potential for each week of our study period using data reported in
six of thirty-two provinces. We selected these six provinces based on their
representativeness of the country’s sub-climates and data availability. On average,
transmission potential fluctuated seasonally, rising between April and November of each
year, coincident with the rainy season, and fell shortly thereafter (Fig. 2). When we
compared the temporal dynamics of transmission potential to reported disease incidence
by visual inspection, we found that the number of emerging disease cases reported weekly
peaked before transmission potential had reached a seasonal maximum for both
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outbreaks (chikungunya and Zika), while the number of dengue cases reported weekly
peaked after this point for two of the three dengue outbreaks (Fig. 2a). We measured the
number of weeks elapsed between outbreak cases and Index P during each season and
found that, on average, dengue cases peaked 17 weeks after Index P. In contrast,
chikungunya cases peaked 14 weeks and Zika cases peaked 27 weeks earlier than Index
P (Fig. 2a, circles). Similar climatological patterns persisted on the provincial level (Fig.
2b). Some provinces experienced clear seasonal fluctuations in transmission potential,
whereas seasonal peaks and troughs were less defined in Distrito Nacional and María
Trinidad Sánchez, which have low to moderately humid sub-climates. Despite this
variation, the timing of provincial outbreaks conformed to the trend observed with visual
examination on the national level: dengue outbreaks peaked after a period characterized
by high transmission potential, just as transmission potential was beginning to wane; in
contrast emerging disease outbreaks occurred concurrently with increasing transmission
potential. Moreover, we cannot attribute climatic anomalies to the decline in reported
dengue cases in Seasons 3, 5, and 6.
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Figure 2: Emerging disease outbreaks occurred during periods of sub-optimal
climate. (a) Average weekly transmission potential (Index P) and nationally reported
cases. Index P describes the reproductive potential of an individual female Aedes
mosquito, meaning its absolute value should be interpreted biologically rather than
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epidemiologically. Relative fluctuations in Index P reflect seasonal changes in the
expected rate of mosquito-borne virus transmission. The peaks of each curve during each
season are denoted as circles on the top x-axis. (b) Index P and reported cases for six
provinces. Temperature and humidity data were retrieved from the National Meteorology
Office (ONAMET) database (saip.gob.do) for Distrito Nacional, Barahona, Puerto Plata,
María Trinidad Sánchez, and Santiago. Hourly climatological data for Monseñor Nouel
were obtained from Open Weather Map (openweathermap.org). Reported cases of
dengue, chikungunya, and Zika were organized by province based on the individual’s
place of residence.

The sizes of the susceptible human population influenced the speed at which
emerging viruses spread
Variability in seasonal weather patterns and vectorial capacity did not account for
differences in the timing of emerging disease outbreaks (Fig. 2). Rather, we hypothesized
that the patterns observed for dengue were likely to have been influenced by a pre-existing
and spatially heterogeneous herd immunity landscape. This would mandate that
transmission potential must remain high for an extended period before epidemic growth is
achieved each season.
To test the hypothesis that local susceptibility influenced the timing of the
outbreaks, we examined the relationship between the size of the susceptible human
population and each outbreak’s doubling time (Fig. 3). We estimated that the median
estimated effective reproduction number (R eff) for the three dengue outbreaks was
between 1.3 and 1.4, while those of the chikungunya and Zika outbreaks ranged from 1.6
to 2.45 (Fig. 3a). These findings are consistent with the epidemiology of the three diseases
and previous estimates of Reff for chikungunya and Zika 26,42,43. Published estimates of the
basic reproduction number (R0) for dengue, equivalent to R eff in a wholly susceptible
population, vary widely (0.97-65) due to the parameter’s sensitivity to the size of the local
susceptible population 44. We observed a slightly longer doubling time (smaller Reff) during
the third dengue outbreak, consistent with increasing levels of herd immunity from the two
previous outbreaks. In our dataset, reported dengue cases were primarily in the 0-15 age
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group, indicating older age groups had high levels of pre-existing immunity and were not
susceptible to disease (Table 1; Fig. 3b). In contrast, we speculated that the entire
population was susceptible to chikungunya and Zika, allowing these viruses to spread
despite sub-optimal weather conditions, facilitating an earlier outbreak peak, and affecting
a much wider range of ages (Table 1; Fig. 3b).
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Figure 3: The size of the susceptible population was larger for emerging diseases
than dengue. (a) The effective reproduction number (Reff) of chikungunya and Zika far
exceeded that of dengue. Reff was calculated using the growth rate of each outbreak 45
and estimates of the incubation period and serial interval of each disease (Supplementary
Table 2). (b) The median age of reported cases during emerging disease outbreaks
significantly exceeded that of the three dengue outbreaks. The median age group of the
national population is 20-25 as calculated from population data reported in the 2010
census. Horizontal lines (dotted) indicate the median age for each group of cases.

Spatial distribution of dengue attack rates is a poor indicator for initial outbreaks of
emerging disease
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Given that the timing of emerging disease outbreaks (chikungunya and Zika) did
not conform to that of dengue outbreaks (Fig. 1,2), we suspected that the spatial
distribution of dengue cases would be equally uninformative for chikungunya and Zika
outbreaks. Specifically, we hypothesized that the relative burden of dengue within
provinces during individual outbreaks would correlate with the burden of dengue during
subsequent outbreaks but not with the relative burden of emerging disease cases.
To address this question, we measured the age- and sex-adjusted attack rates by
province for each of the outbreaks. We found that the attack rates for individual provinces
across outbreaks were well correlated between dengue outbreaks and between
chikungunya and Zika outbreaks, but not across the endemic and emerging viruses (Fig.
4a, b).
Next, we investigated the role of climate and land-use in perpetuating this trend,
reasoning that larger mosquito populations would facilitate higher attack rates 36,46. To this
end, we compared an Aedes aegypti suitability score (AaS; Fig. 4c), a metric that
incorporates ecological variables not included in our transmission potential estimates such
as vegetation levels and precipitation, to population-adjusted attack rates of disease
(Supplementary Figure 2, Fig. 4a). Also unlike our transmission potential estimates, AaS
is an aggregated estimate of suitability per month in any given year. Interestingly, AaS
was not well correlated with the adjusted provincial attack rates or with mean age of
infection (Supplementary Figure 2). Moreover, provinces in which the highest levels of
mosquito abundance were predicted did not consistently report the highest burden of
disease (Fig. 4a,c). One reason for these inconsistencies is that AaS relies on historical
climate data from 1970 to 2000 to estimate mosquito abundance. Therefore, our estimates
do not capture anomalous climatological events such as the hurricane that made landfall
in the Dominican Republic in October 2012. AaS also assumes a high level of stability in
land use and minimal urbanization since the thirty-year period from which the estimates
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were made. Regardless of the true underlying reason for these discrepancies, the spatial
distributions between endemic (dengue) and emerging (chikungunya and Zika) mosquitoborne virus diseases are not very well correlated.

Figure 4: The spatial distribution of dengue cases is not well correlated with that of
emerging disease cases or with estimated mosquito abundance. (a) Population-,
age-, and sex-adjusted attack rates were significantly correlated within provinces across
dengue outbreaks and between Zika and chikungunya outbreaks. Simple linear
regression was used to measure the correlation between the log number of cases reported
during each outbreak by province. One province, Elías Piña, was excluded because of
assumed substantial under-reporting: the province reported 1 dengue case during Season
1 and 1 chikungunya case in a population of 63,250. (b) R2 values for dengue vs dengue
(D vs D), dengue vs emerging (D vs E), and emerging vs emerging (E vs E) calculated by
linear regression. (c) Mosquito abundance (AaS) was normalized across provinces.
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Clinical outcomes of dengue cases and trends in febrile illness cases are indicators
of disease prevalence
Up to this point, our findings demonstrate that emerging mosquito-borne disease
outbreaks are not confined to the temporal and spatial patterns of endemic disease
outbreaks in the Dominican Republic (Figs. 1-4). While similar inconsistencies in outbreak
dynamics have been observed elsewhere in the Americas (Supplementary Figure 3)
23,24

, it is difficult to discern if our findings are due to differences in epidemiology or in

underlying reporting biases. Therefore, we used general patterns of febrile illness and
clinical characteristics to show that reporting biases did not influence our previous
conclusions (Fig. 5).
Because the vast majority of cases in our dataset reported fever independent of
disease (Table 1), we hypothesized that febrile illness incidence should reflect disease
incidence reported during our study period. When we examined the number of febrile
illness cases reported in the Dominican Republic per epidemiological week per season,
we found that temporal trends in febrile illness cases in Season 3 (2014-2015) and Season
5 (2016-2017; Fig. 5a) were consistent with those we observed in our chikungunya and
Zika case data, respectively (Fig. 1a). In Season 4 (2015-2016, dengue), febrile illness
cases peaked in week 44, coincident with the peak of the dengue outbreak (Fig. 1a). To
ensure that the spatial relationships we identified in Figure 4 were not purely the product
of differential reporting practices, we compared population-adjusted attack rates of
mosquito-borne disease and febrile illness reported by individual provinces during each
season and found no significant correlation (Supplementary Figure 4). Equally
pronounced seasonal peaks of reported febrile illness were not observed in Season 1 and
Season 2 despite the known dengue outbreaks that occurred within that period. We
speculate that changes made in reporting protocols for febrile illness cases during the
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chikungunya outbreak in Season 3 prompted a sustained increase in national reporting
thereafter 47.
We then investigated why reported febrile illness cases peaked seasonally in
Seasons 5 and 6 despite an apparent decline in coincident dengue cases by comparing
case-fatality rates (CFRs) of dengue cases across seasons. Specifically, we considered
the possibility that this decline was due to under-reporting of dengue cases during the
interim periods between dengue outbreaks (Seasons 3, 5, and 6). The average CFR
during these seasons was 1.87% (range: 1.60%-2.40%), while the average CFR of
reported cases during the three large dengue outbreaks in Seasons 1, 2, and 4 was 0.8%
(range: 0.48%-1.20%) (Fig. 5b). A wide range of dengue CFRs is reported in the literature,
with a mean of 1.62% (95% CI: 0.64–4.02%) 48, and without serosurveillance data, we are
unable to rule out the possibility that the circulation of different dengue serotypes resulted
in differences in seasonal CFRs. However, if we assume that fatality among cases during
the third dengue outbreak (Season 4) were well reported, dengue cases were underreported by 33% in Season 3 and Season 5, and by 2-fold in Season 6. These are likely
conservative estimates as the current surveillance system is passive and therefore does
not capture asymptomatic cases. As a result, Seasons 3, 5, and 6 may represent periods
characterized by a large number of mild cases that were not captured by the surveillance
system. It is also likely that the number of deaths due to chikungunya was substantially
under-reported; however, our calculation of 0.19% corresponds to a corrected, post-hoc
estimate of this rate (0.15%) for the Dominican Republic
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Figure 5: Reported febrile illness cases and case fatality rates of dengue cases
during inter-dengue-outbreak periods exceeded those reported during dengue
outbreaks. (a) Temporal trends in weekly febrile illness cases reflect temporal trends in
reported dengue, chikungunya, and Zika cases. Acute febrile illness cases reported by
epidemiological week per municipality were obtained from the National Statistics
Directorate of the Ministry of Health (saip.gob.do). Weekly cases were aggregated to the
national level. Chikungunya and Zika outbreak peaks are denoted by the gray box. (b)
Percent case fatality rates (CFR) for dengue cases rose during seasons in which no
dengue outbreak was reported. CFRs were calculated for six seasons of reported dengue
cases (S1-S6) and two seasons of emerging disease cases (chikungunya (C) and Zika
(Z)).
DISCUSSION
Our study demonstrates that, even when transmitted by the same mosquito vector,
viruses are not beholden to the same temporal and spatial outbreak dynamics. Instead,
when and where the new virus is introduced, the size of the susceptible human population,
and the capacity of local surveillance systems determine these dynamics are detected. In
short, dengue epidemiology cannot be used to anticipate the location and timing of future
emerging mosquito-borne disease outbreaks in the Dominican Republic, and likely in other
Caribbean countries and territories. Instead, consistent and sustainable surveillance
methods should be implemented to limit disease and prevent future outbreaks. These
methods could include serosurveillance of the population during periods between
outbreaks 50, testing local mosquito vectors for viral infections
outcomes of travelers who visit the country

54

.
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51–53

, and monitoring health

Maintaining a sustainable surveillance system is critical for preventing the silent
transmission of viruses that can fuel large outbreaks. Other countries in the Americas
reported subsequent outbreaks of chikungunya and Zika after their initial outbreaks. We
cannot conclusively determine whether the Dominican Republic experienced a similar
pattern because surveillance data for chikungunya and Zika are not available for seasons
following the initial outbreaks of these diseases. Elucidating whether dengue,
chikungunya, and Zika are co-circulating in the country will be critical for triaging and
providing appropriate clinical care to patients who present with febrile illness 55, especially
if chikungunya and Zika virus transmission is now in sync with dengue transmission

56,57

.

Understanding the role of immunity in modulating the rate of arbovirus spread in the
population will help to clarify this latter point. Such a relationship has been observed in the
context of vaccination campaigns, during which annual viral outbreak peaks shift later in
the year as the population is immunized

58

. For this reason, the frequency of outbreaks

across years likely does impact the timing of the individual outbreaks and may cause
arboviral outbreaks to become synced.
Equally important is the identification of viruses that could spread across
international borders. In our study, we observed an epidemiological link between Zika
outbreaks in Haiti and the south-west region of the Dominican Republic. This connection
likely extends to other mosquito-borne viruses such as Mayaro virus and West Nile virus,
which have been reported in Haiti
mosquitoes

14,62–64

59–61

. The former can be transmitted by Aedes

, and the latter has been isolated from zoonotic reservoirs in the

Dominican Republic 65. Similarly, reports of international travelers carrying mosquito-borne
viruses from the Dominican Republic back to their home countries demonstrate that gaps
in surveillance have global implications

66–71

. Therefore, understanding the transmission

patterns of viruses and developing a unified, international plan to combat them before they
cause an outbreak will help mitigate the potential for such an event.
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Our findings suggest that dengue cases were under-reported following the Zika
outbreak in 2016; however, there are a number of possible explanations for the ostensible
decline in dengue cases that should be explored. Wide-spread mosquito control measures
motivated by the Zika outbreak could have limited the spread of dengue later that year.
Although plausible, this line of reasoning does not explain why a similar post-Zika decline
was observed in other countries in the Americas

72

, nor why there was a resurgence of

dengue cases in 2019. A second explanation is that Zika infections confer some level of
temporary immunity to subsequent dengue infections 73–76. This theory cannot account for
the small number of dengue cases reported in 2014 following the chikungunya outbreak,
as the etiological agent of that disease is an alphavirus, and it assumes very high attack
rates and extensive under-reporting of Zika in 2016 to have achieved sufficient levels of
herd immunity. Our findings instead suggest that prior Zika infection protects against
symptomatic dengue infections because we observed significant positive correlation
between dengue attack rates within provinces across outbreaks. Given that cross-reacting
immunity between dengue serotypes is well documented

77,78

, our data suggest that a

similar relationship between dengue and Zika would not result in a wide-spread decline of
cases. Rather, dengue transmission could have reasonably persisted undetected if most
of those infected were not hospitalized. If true, this hypothesis would explain why seasonal
peaks in reported febrile illness cases persisted in 2017 and 2018, and why CFRs among
reported dengue cases appeared to be elevated in Seasons 5 and 6 if the true number of
cases was under-reported. To better understand these complex interactions, the collection
of serotype information should be incorporated into current dengue surveillance efforts.
There are a few important limitations to our study. First, our dataset included
chikungunya and Zika case data from the initial wave of each disease, and we cannot
therefore compare temporal and spatial dynamics of these diseases across seasons. After
these initial outbreaks, diagnostic testing for these diseases has largely ceased. While the
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number of cases of these diseases reported in the Dominican Republic has declined to
zero the true burden of disease is unknown. Future studies should investigate whether
these viruses have continued to circulate undetected in the country and whether their
spatiotemporal dynamics have since synchronized with that of dengue virus. Second, the
reporting system for suspected chikungunya cases differed from that used for suspected
Zika cases. During the chikungunya outbreak, most febrile illnesses cases without
apparent cause were initially classified as suspected chikungunya cases. For this reason,
the number of cases reported by the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) and the
Ministry of Health was significantly larger than those which we have reported here

79

. Our

chikungunya case data contains a disproportionate number of children in the <1 year age
group, indicating that the dissemination of diagnostic testing may have been skewed
towards high-risk groups. Third, our findings demonstrate that an epidemiological
relationship existed between the Dominican Republic and Haiti during the Zika epidemic
in 2016, but we cannot determine the directionality of cross-border virus movement without
virus genomic data. However, given that mosquitoes do not recognize political boundaries,
it is possible that the infected vectors themselves move between countries. More likely,
human movement between the two countries facilitated by the main roadway (Fig. 1e)
drives the longer-distance, international spread of the viruses

80

. Regardless of the exact

mechanism, it can be assumed that bi-directional spillover of mosquito-borne diseases will
occur in the future unless appropriate bi-national surveillance and control measures are
implemented. Finally, our analysis primarily focused on virus transmission by Aedes
aegypti mosquitoes, but it is possible that other mosquito vectors contributed to the
propagation of the outbreaks we investigated. Specifically, Aedes albopictus may have
played a key role in chikungunya transmission

81,82

. Limited data are available on the

distribution of relevant mosquito vectors in the country
surveillance is needed to better address this question.
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83,84

, and broader entomological

Taken together, our study demonstrates that surveillance for mosquito-borne
diseases should be sustained during periods when transmission appears to be low
because patterns in reported dengue cases are poor indicators of future emerging
mosquito-borne virus outbreak dynamics. Reported symptoms and case demographics
may be useful for identifying shifts in disease prevalence, but many clinical features,
especially fever, that we have noted are likely a function of the reporting and diagnostic
algorithms used during an outbreak. Active reporting of new dengue, chikungunya, and
Zika cases and the broader deployment of diagnostics for newly emerged diseases are
needed to ascertain more accurate case profiles. Outbreaks of emerging tropical diseases
are a threat to the public health of the Caribbean, and endemic diseases such as dengue
precipitate health crises with increasing frequency. Given the pervasiveness of mosquitoborne diseases in tropical climates, sustainable surveillance systems rather than
reactionary disease control measures should be implemented to prevent future crises.
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METHODS
Description of data
Data for suspected and confirmed cases of dengue, chikungunya, and Zika
reported between 2012-2018 were extracted from the Dominican Republic Ministry of
Health Weekly Reports (digepi.gob.do). Depersonalized demographic and clinical
characteristics of cases were solicited from the National Statistics Directorate of the
Ministry of Health (MoH) (saip.gob.do). Data were organized by date of onset of symptom
report.
The National Epidemiology Directorate of the MOH collects dengue case reports
by passive surveillance in a weekly manner in its Epi 1 form within their Sistema Nacional
de Vigilancia Epidemiológica (SINAVE) Digital Platform for every healthcare setting across
the country. These data were collected in weekly reports submitted to their website
(digepi.gob.do) and organized by province and week of reported cases. The data collected
by the MoH includes age, sex, province and municipality of residence, date of symptom
onset, clinical outcome, and symptomatology. The MoH included mandatory reports from
suspected and confirmed chikungunya infection through 2014 and Zika virus throughout
2016, without continuing to do so thereafter.
Province- and municipality-level weekly acute febrile illness data from 2012-2018
were solicited from the National Epidemiology Directorate of the Ministry of Health
(saip.gob.do), which collects the data as part of a passive surveillance system. In 2014,
the Ministry of Health increased its efforts to identify febrile illness cases
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Because the case data described above are publicly available upon solicitation to
the proper institutions and consist of depersonalized data, we did not need to seek ethical
approval per our IRB.
Daily climatological variables for mean temperature and relative humidity for 5
cities (Santo Domingo, Distrito Nacional; Barahona, Barahona; La Union, Puerto Plata;
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Cabrera, María Trinidad Sánchez; Santiago, Santiago) was collected from the National
Meteorology Office (ONAMET) database (saip.gob.do) from January 2012 through
December 2018. Hourly climatological data for Bonao, Monseñor Nouel for the same
timeframe were obtained from openweathermap.org.
Population data were extracted from the 9th National Population and Household
Census. This census was conducted in 2010 by the National Statistics Office

85

.

Reported cases of dengue, chikungunya, and Zika for Haiti, Bolivia, Jamaica, and
Venezuela were extracted from the Pan-American Health Organization website and PLISA
database 86. Dengue and Zika cases, which were reported by epidemiological week, were
aggregated by month to allow for a direct comparison to chikungunya cases, which were
reported by month.

Time to outbreak peak
Using the weekly reported data collected by the MoH, we calculated the time to
peak for provincial outbreaks by first identifying the epidemiological week in which the first
case of the national outbreak was reported (chikungunya: EW 6, Zika: EW 1, dengue (3):
EW 14) and then counting the number of weeks elapsed until each of the 32 provinces
reported the maximum number of cases for the corresponding outbreak. The mean time
to peak for each outbreak was compared using a one-way ANOVA test with Tukey’s
multiple comparison test implemented in Prism v8.4.2.
Transmission potential
We calculated weekly transmission potential (Index P) with the Bayesian approach
developed by Obolski et al. 17. Briefly, we extracted daily average temperature and relative
humidity for 6 cities from the National Meteorology Office database or, in the case of
Monseñor Nouel province, openweathermap.org. Rarely, temperature or humidity were
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not available for a given day. In these cases, we averaged the respective variable from
the same date across the remaining 6 years. We did this for 14 days for Barahona and
Puerto Plata, 3 days for Santiago, and 1 day for María Trinidad Sánchez.
We then used the R package MVSE and entomological and epidemiological priors
documented in the literature (Supplementary Table 1) to calculate daily transmission
potential, from which we calculated weekly means for the duration of our study period

17

.

We found that the model was reasonably robust to a range of priors for each of the
parameters and therefore elected to use short human incubation and infectious period
estimates to inform the model. We adopted our prior estimate of human life expectancy to
the Dominican Republic based on estimates by the United Nations Development Program
87

, but otherwise used the same priors as reported by Oboloski et al. (Supplementary

Table 1) 17.

Effective reproduction number (Reff) estimates
We estimated Reff for the five outbreaks using the method developed by Lipsitch
et al. 45 to fit a linear regression model to our case data (Eq. 1).

𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑓 = 𝑟 2 ∗ (1 − 𝑓) ∗ 𝑓 ∗ 𝑣 2 + 𝑟 ∗ 𝑣 + 1

Eq. 1

We used a range of values for latent and infectious periods that were well reported
in the literature to calculate f, the proportion of the incubation period in the serial interval,
and v, the serial interval measured in weeks (Supplementary Table 2). Specifically, we
estimated the minimum Reff values using the minimum estimates of the incubation period
and serial interval for each disease (Supplementary Table 2), to calculate f and v,
respectively. We repeated this process with the maximum estimates for each interval to
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obtain the maximum values for Reff. The median of each pair of values is indicated by
horizontal bars in Fig. 3a. We obtained r, the epidemic growth rate, by fitting a generalized
linear model to the cumulative reported cases for each outbreak and extracting the slope
from the model. All calculations were done using R v4.0.0.

Adjusted attack rates and linear regression
Province-level attack rates by outbreak were age- and sex-adjusted using the
direct standardization method, with daily reported cases as the input and the national
population as the reference population.
We calculated Pearson’s R correlation coefficient for province-level attack rates
between various pairs of outbreaks (Fig. 4a,b). An outlier analysis showed that the
removal of outliers did not substantially affect the size or significance of the correlation
coefficients, so we included all data points.

Aedes aegypti suitability score (AaS)
We used AaS values calculated for each month by Kraemer et al.

18

, who used

both climate and land-use data on a 5km x 5 km scale collected from 1970 and 2000 and
compiled by WorldClim. Monthly suitability scores were extracted and averaged by
province in Rv4.0.0.

DATA AVAILABILITY
With the exception of global AaS and surveillance data, source data are available
with

this

paper

(https://github.com/grubaughlab/Paper_arbovirus_Epi_DR)
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Surveillance data are available upon solicitation of the Dominican Republic Ministry of
Health SAIP (Solicitud de Acceso a Informacion Publica/Solicitation of Publicly Available

46

Information; website: saip.gob.do). Climatological data may be obtained from the National
Meteorology Office (ONAMET). Depersonalized demographic and clinical characteristics
of cases may be obtained from the National Statistics Directorate of the Ministry of Health
(MoH). Weekly dengue, chikugunya, and Zika case data may be obtained from the
Sistema Nacional de Vigilancia Epidemiológica (SINAVE). Febrile illness case data may
be obtained from the National Epidemiology Directorate of the Ministry of Health. Global
AaS values may be available upon request.

CODE AVAILABILITY
The R scripts for this manuscript are available on GitHub
(https://github.com/grubaughlab/Paper_arbovirus_Epi_DR).
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Supplementary Figure 1: The proportion of dengue cases who reported experiencing a
rash peaked earlier in the south-western region Enriquillo compared to the rest of the
country. The number of dengue cases with rash were summed for each month. The gray box
denotes when the Zika outbreak occurred.
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Supplementary Figure 2: Minimal correlation between adjusted log attack rates,
force of infection, and the average mosquito abundance (AaS) by province. In both
analyses, one province, Elías Piña, was excluded because of assumed substantial underreporting. This province, which has a population of 63,250 according to the 2010 Census,
reported 1 dengue case during Season 1 and 1 chikungunya case during that outbreak.
(a) Log adjusted attack rates vs AaS. Simple linear regression was used to measure
correlation between log cases with AaS. (b) Mean age of infection vs AaS (force of
infection = mean age of infection -1). Simple linear regression was used to measure
correlation between mean age and AaS.
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Supplementary Figure 3: Asynchronicity of reported dengue, chikungunya, and
Zika outbreaks in three countries in the Americas. Cases were normalized by
individual outbreak. Monthly (chikungunya) and weekly (dengue and Zika) case data were
obtained from the Pan-American Health Organization website (https://www.paho.org/en).
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Supplementary Figure 4: No significant correlation between disease and febrile
illness attack rates reported by province during dengue, chikungunya, and Zika
outbreaks. Log population-adjusted attack rates per 10,000 individuals were calculated
for each of the 31 provinces using disease and febrile illness data reported during each
outbreak. Each data point represents a province. For the reasons stated above, the
province Elías Piña was excluded from the analysis. Colors correspond to the scheme
used in Fig. 4c. Simple linear regression was used to measure correlation between log
cases of febrile illness and log cases of dengue, chikungunya, and Zika.
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Supplementary Table 1: Priors for Index P estimates
Parameter

Prior distribution

Sources

Human
Incubation
Period

Gaussian (mean = 5, SD = 1)

1–3

Human
Infectious
Period

Gaussian (mean = 5, SD = 1)

1–3

Human Life
Expectancy

Gaussian (mean = 73, SD = 2)

4

Transmission
probability
(human to
mosquito)

Gaussian (mean = 0.5, SD = 0.01)

5

Mosquito
Biting Rate

Gaussian (mean = 0.25, SD = 0.05)

6,7

Extrinsic
Incubation
Period

Gaussian (mean = 7, SD = 2)

2,8,9

Mosquito Life
Expectancy

Gaussian (mean = 14, SD = 3)

10,11

Supplementary Table 2: Reff estimation parameters
Incubation period Infectious
Serial Interval
(days)
period (days) (days)

Sources

Dengue

4-6

9-11

13-17

12

Zika

3-14

7-8

10-23

13,14

Chikungunya 2-12

7-9

9-21

15,16
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ABSTRACT
There is an urgent need to expand testing for SARS-CoV-2 and other respiratory
pathogens as the global community struggles to control the COVID-19 pandemic.
Current diagnostic methods can be affected by supply chain bottlenecks and
require the assistance of medical professionals, impeding the implementation of
large-scale testing. Self-collection of saliva may solve these problems, as it can be
completed without specialized training and uses generic materials. In this study,
we observed thirty individuals who self-collected saliva using four different
collection devices and analyzed their feedback. Two of these devices, a funnel and
bulb pipette, were used to evaluate at-home saliva collection by 60 individuals. All
devices enabled the safe, unsupervised self-collection of saliva. The quantity and
quality of the samples received were acceptable for SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic
testing, as determined by RNase P detection. Here, we demonstrate inexpensive,
generic, buffer free collection devices suitable for unsupervised and home saliva
self-collection.
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INTRODUCTION
Over a year since COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, the demand for
testing remains high. Even with the rollout of several vaccines, successful control
strategies still depend upon the availability of reliable, scalable testing programs.
Self-collection of saliva for SARS-CoV-2 testing can facilitate these. Numerous
studies have shown that saliva is an equally sensitive substrate for the detection
of SARS-CoV-2 RNA as nasopharyngeal swabs (Hanson et al., 2020; Tan et al.,
2021; Vogels et al., 2020; Wong et al., 2020; Wyllie et al., 2020). Unlike sampling
with nasopharyngeal swabs, self-collection of saliva is non-invasive and does not
require specialized training to perform (Marty et al., 2020). Moreover, SARS-CoV2 RNA is stable in saliva at a broad range of temperatures and for an extended
period of time, obviating the need for cold chain storage and preservatives or
buffers that increase the costs of collection (Ott et al., 2021).
While saliva has been used as a diagnostic testing substrate for pathogenic
antibodies (Drobnik et al., 2011; Korhonen et al., 2014; Reynolds and Muwonga,
2004), its utility in viral pathogen detection has been limited to viruses like human
immunodeficiency virus (Yapijakis et al., 2006), measles, mumps, and rubella (Jin
et al., 2002), human papillomavirus (Adamopoulou et al., 2008), Epstein-Barr virus
(Idesawa et al., 2004) and certain viral co-infections (Kim et al., 2017; Robinson et
al., 2008; Yoon et al., 2017), all strictly in research settings. Before 2020, the only
PCR-based diagnostic test using saliva (saliva swabs) approved or authorized by
the FDA was for the detection of human cytomegalovirus in babies (FDA, 2018).
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Through the development of saliva-based diagnostic tests, COVID-19 testing
became more accessible.
Despite its advantages, if saliva is collected improperly, it is difficult to
handle in the laboratory (Landry et al., 2020). Improper self-collection may also
pose a safety risk if potentially biohazardous materials are mishandled. Therefore,
it is essential that self-collection of saliva is safe and can produce testable
samples. Equally important is establishing the acceptability of self-collection
among the general public because methods that are deemed uncomfortable,
difficult, or confusing are unlikely to gain traction in the population.
In this study, we evaluated the experience of thirty individuals who selfcollected saliva using four different saliva collection devices: a P1000 pipette tip,
a Salimetrics Saliva Collection Aid (Salimetrics LLC, Pennsylvania, USA), a funnel,
and a bulb pipette (Figure 1a). We found that all four devices enabled the
consistent and safe collection of true saliva that was acceptable for SARS-CoV-2
diagnostic testing with a RT-qPCR-based assay (Vogels et al., 2020). Using this
information, we next evaluated the suitability of both a funnel and a bulb pipette for
unsupervised at-home saliva collection. Our findings demonstrate the suitability of
multiple device options for use in saliva self-collection kits. This variety not only
helps to avoid supply chain bottlenecks but could also promote broader
acceptance of this method by improving the ease of self-collection and of sample
processing in the laboratory.

RESULTS
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All four saliva collections devices were deemed usable by the study
participants, but individual preference influenced their relative acceptability.
We aimed to enroll participants who represented a range of racial and
educational backgrounds (Table 1). In 100% of the observed collections, study
participants appeared confident in their ability to complete the collection correctly
(Figure S2). The majority of participants (93%) understood the importance of
following the instructions carefully to avoid incorrect test results, and during only
two collections (1.67%), participants appeared to not adequately follow these
instructions for proper sample collection (Figure S2b).
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Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the participants from the pilot study and
the at-home collection kit study.
Pilot study (n=30)

At-home kit (n=60)

Category

n (%)

Overall (%) Bulb (%, n= 31) Funnel (%, n=29)

Male

11 (37)

28 (47)

14 (45)

14 (48)

Female

19 (63)

32 (53)

17 (55)

15 (52)

18-29

7 (23)

13 (22)

7 (23)

6 (21)

30-39

16 (53)

27 (45)

11 (35)

16 (16)

40-49

4 (13)

5 (8)

4 (13)

1 (3)

50-59

0 (0)

5 (8)

3 (10)

2 (7)

60-69

1 (3)

6 (10)

4 (13)

2 (7)

70+

2 (7)

4 (7)

2 (6)

2 (7)

High School/GED

2 (7)

15 (25)

9 (29)

6 (21)

Bachelors

7 (23)

21 (35)

11 (35)

10 (34)

Masters

10 (33)

11 (18)

7 (23)

4 (14)

PhD/MD

11 (37)

13 (22)

4 (13)

9 (31)

Black/African American

4 (13)

10 (17)

6 (19)

4 (14)

Hispanic/Latino

4 (13)

10 (17)

5 (16)

5 (17)

Asian/South Asian

6 (20)

7 (12)

4 (13)

3 (10)

White

15 (50)

33 (55)

16 (52)

17 (59)

Native American

1 (3)

0 (0)

0

0

Sex

Age

Education

Race

Of the 10 participant survey questions, only Question 5 (“Was collecting the
sample difficult in general?”) varied statistically significantly across devices;
however, this question was found to not be internally reliable (Table S1, S2). In
this case, the bulb pipette scored the least favorably (mean = 3.1) compared to the
other devices (pipette tip, mean = 2; funnel, mean = 2.3; collection aid, mean =
1.7) (Figure S2). Participants commented that the bulb pipette introduced bubbles
and caused discomfort if it suctioned the inside of their mouth (Table 2). Despite
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this feedback, all participants provided a sufficient volume of saliva for testing with
all four devices, the majority did not think they required assistance during the
sample collection (93%), and in only 18 collections (16%), participants did not feel
confident that they had collected the sample correctly with the bulb pipette (Figure
1). Similarly, observers reported that the majority of participants did not appear to
struggle with the collection process (115/120, 95.8%, Figure S2b).

Table 2: Participant observations and experiences with the unobserved collection.
Survey comments from participants from pilot study and the at-home collection kits. The
comments presented here are representative but not exhaustive. Abbreviations: No. =
number.
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Figure 1: Collection devices are inexpensive, easy to use, and yield testable
samples. Survey responses were reported from strongly disagree to strongly agree. (a)
The four collection devices tested are inexpensive and provide users with a range of
features to choose from. Prices at time of publication are shown in US dollars. (b)
Participants reported being self-sufficient and confident in their ability to correctly collect
saliva samples (from Figure S2). The questions are displayed above the corresponding
graphs. The percentage response value for each device is shown above each bar. Two
sets of participant responses were excluded because one participant did not provide a
response for all four devices and one did not understand the response scale.
Abbreviations: P = pipette tip, C = collection aid, F = funnel, B = bulb pipette.
In addition to answering the survey questions, participants were given the
opportunity to provide general feedback. Each device received a range of comments
from participants reflecting differences in personal preference (Table 2). For example,
though the bulb pipette received the largest number of negative comments (n=11), one
participant stated it was their favorite of the four devices. Interestingly, there was no
general consensus around an overall preferred device; however, the size of the devices
was a common theme among participant feedback. Some participants (4/30, 13%) found
the pipette tip and collection aid to be too small, whereas the large size of the funnel and
its collection tube were noted to be an advantage. More research is needed to determine
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which types of devices may be most suitable for specific demographic groups, but it is
likely that providing a range of options will promote the general acceptability of saliva
self-collection for pathogen diagnostic testing.

Figure 2: At-home saliva collection kit components suitable for sample collection.
a) Each of the participants were sent an at-home collection kit comprised of either a funnel
(i) or bulb pipette (ii) with a labeled screw-cap tube (iii), patient identifier sticker (iv),
biohazard collection bag with absorbent sheet (v), FedEx UN 3373 Pak (vi), an alcohol
pad (vii), and box for return shipment (viii). b) Participant confidence in at-home selfcollection of saliva when using either a funnel or bulb pipette (from Figure S4). Survey
responses were reported on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Overall,
there was no significant difference between the collection devices in relation to the
participant’s confidence and ability to use either device. The questions are displayed
above the corresponding graphs. Abbreviations: F = funnel, B = bulb pipette.

Unsupervised saliva collection can be reliably conducted at home.
In order to achieve diversity in the demographics of the participants, we
selected 84 of the 246 participants who consented to unsupervised at-home saliva
collection study, based on age, sex, race and educational status. The participants
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were sent self-collection kits containing either a funnel (n=43) or bulb transfer
pipette (n=41) to aid saliva collection. Of those distributed, 66 kits were returned,
however 6 participants did not complete the survey, so were excluded from the
study. Overall, survey responses following unsupervised collection were favorable
(Figure 2b, Figure S4). Participants reported feeling confident with carrying out
self-collection properly and that the process was not difficult. Importantly, study
participants clearly understood the required process of sample collection, with
100% of participants acknowledging that they understood not to eat/drink/smoke
prior to collecting the sample, and 88.33% understood that incorrect sampling
could result in false results (Figure S4). There were slight differences in the user
experience between bulb pipette kits and the funnel kits; 16% of the participants
found that the sample collection was difficult with the bulb pipette as compared to
only 7% of the participants using the funnel.

Self-collection of saliva was safe and yielded testable samples.
Ensuring the proper handling of potentially biohazardous material is an
essential consideration for saliva self-collection to be implemented on a large
scale. Specifically, contamination of the collection tube with virus-infected saliva
poses the greatest health and safety risk for this method.
Some participants did contaminate the outside of their collection tubes with
saliva during the pilot collection (27.8%) and the at-home kit study (21.7%), but
participants from the pilot study were observed sanitizing the collection tube with
an alcohol wipe in accordance with the provided instructions and the majority of
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at-home study participants reported understanding what to do in this situation.
Additionally, as directed in the written instructions, 87% of participants in the pilot
study washed or sanitized their hands before and after completing the collections.
Regardless, strict sample handling safety precautions should be applied by all
testing laboratories when receiving any clinical sample type.
Our secondary objective was to compare the quality of samples collected
using each device. We found that all of the samples received (both unobserved as
well as unsupervised at-home self-collection) were of sufficient quality for testing
with SalivaDirect (Vogels et al., 2020), demonstrating how true saliva, which
naturally pools in the mouth, can be easily handled in the laboratory. Specifically,
laboratory survey responses confirmed that 100% of the samples collected during
the pilot study were easy to pipette and of sufficient volume (>0.5 mL) (Figure 3,
Figure S3). Slight discoloration was noted in 18 samples (15%) and food particles
were observed in 20 samples (5 participants, 16.7%), but these did not affect test
results. No sample tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. The average cycle threshold
(Ct) value for the negative control, RNAse P (RP), was within the expected range
(23-28 Cts) (Wyllie et al., 2020) for the majority of samples from the pilot study
(73%), indicating that the use of different collection methods did not interfere with
the diagnostic assay (Figure 3). We did not find a significant difference between
matched samples across devices using one-way ANOVA (Figure. S3).
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Figure 3: The quality of the samples was adequate for testing with a PCR-based
assay. Laboratory survey questions pertaining to the quality of the samples are shown on
the x-axis (from Figures S3, S5). Data points represent the mean response, green dots
represent samples collected from the pilot study and blue dots represent samples
collected from the at-home collection kit. Survey responses were reported on a scale of 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Samples with less favorable responses are
highlighted in red. Mean and standard deviation (st. dev.) are shown in black. The graph
on the right shows the cycle threshold (Ct) values for the internal control RNAse P (RP)
from each of the saliva samples submitted. The blue and green dots represent Ct value
per participant. Ct values over 35 are considered invalid and is highlighted in gray. P-value
is shown using one-way Mann-Whitney. Mean and standard deviation (st. dev.) are shown
in black.

The overall quality of the saliva samples from the at-home kit study was also
acceptable, but with slight differences between the two collection devices. Of the 60
samples returned, 6.7% (n=4) contained less than 0.5 mL saliva (half of the 1 mL tube
provided), all from participants given the bulb pipette collection kit (Figure 3, Figure S4).
Despite this, all 4 samples were sufficient for testing, containing 100-450 µL of saliva.
Besides low volume, the quality of the samples collected with the bulb pipette was high,
with 100% of samples easy to pipet, free from food particles, not discolored and consisting
of only true saliva. On the other hand, while 100% of the samples returned from the
participants with the funnel collection kit were of sufficient volume, 2/29 samples might not
have been “true saliva” and as a result were difficult to pipet. In addition, one of the
samples was slightly discolored.
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DISCUSSION
To combat the ongoing outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2, mass testing strategies which
are cost-effective and free from supply chain disruptions are essential. Additional major
barriers to frequent testing result from a need to schedule appointments at facilities staffed
with trained personnel or testing aversion to swab-based methods. Scaling up the use of
saliva self-collection as a routine diagnostic tool can expand access to testing for SARSCoV-2 and could be reliably performed in workplaces, schools or college dormitories
where regular testing is essential for safe day-to-day operations. To support these efforts,
we aimed to identify saliva collection solutions with generic components without sacrificing
the comfort of the participants or the effectiveness of collection. Results from this study
demonstrate the usability and efficacy of several simple saliva collection methods for
SARS-CoV-2 detection. Importantly, all of the devices promoted the collection of “true”
saliva, which was acceptable for handling in the laboratory, and were deemed usable by
our participants.
The data collected from the pilot study was used to inform our selection of the bulb
pipette and funnel as the saliva collection devices for the at-home saliva collection kits.
Though there was no clear preference in devices based on demographic factors like sex,
education level, ethnicity or age, some of the older participants had issues with saliva
collection using the bulb pipette. More studies can be done to specifically assess the
usability of the collection devices in these specific populations. The availability of the
option for unsupervised sample collection for COVID-19 testing could result in up to onethird more symptomatic persons seeking testing, especially in those populations of
individuals who are at high risk for contracting the infection, or those who are
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unable/unwilling to go into clinical settings (Siegler et al., 2020). With more options
available, individuals can select kits according to their needs and limitations.
We did not directly compare the self-collection process with the aid of a collection
device to the process without a device, but the ability to collect true saliva in simple wide
mouth tubes has been previously demonstrated (Byrne et al., 2020; Wyllie et al., 2020).
Wide-mouth tubes are not conducive for large-scale testing in labs with limited space or
when sample processing requires the use of a liquid-handling robot, a piece of equipment
present in most large clinical laboratories. Therefore, the collection devices we tested
allow for an easy collection process into smaller tubes that are likely more amenable to
the majority of laboratory procedures. Importantly, results from our study also demonstrate
that these devices do not inhibit RNA-extraction free, RT-qPCR based diagnostic assays.
This study also evaluated the instructions for reliable saliva self-collection. The
majority of the participants had no additional feedback, and the few comments we did
receive were all related to the kit instructions, involving font size, mailing instructions and
device assembly (see table 3). This slight confusion was reflected in the participant survey
responses, where 35% of participants were unsure of what to do if saliva came into contact
with the outside of the tube and 26% were unsure of what to do if they had any questions.
This feedback highlighted the need to further refine the instructions in order to decrease
the likelihood of errors in saliva collection and improve the sample collection experience.
Additionally, visual materials such as a video outlining the sample collection and shipping
process could be helpful in future iterations of the kits.
Even with ongoing vaccination campaigns, widespread, routine testing for SARSCoV-2 will remain a staple of public health disease control strategies for at least another
year. For this, unsupervised saliva collection permits feasible, scalable, and affordable
testing solutions.
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Limitations of the study
While the sample size of the pilot study was small, and a majority of study
participants held a college degree or higher, similar results were obtained when we
enrolled a larger, more demographically diverse cohort for the unsupervised, at-home
evaluation. It is important to note that we did not enroll individuals under the age of 18 and
therefore cannot draw conclusions around the usability of these devices in children.
However, large-scale pathogen surveillance testing involving self-collected saliva samples
from school-aged children have been executed for SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens
(Streptococcus pneumoniae) (Bi et al., 2021; Wyllie et al., 2014).
Overall, the response to the collection devices were favorable. However the
sample size was too small to determine if there are age-specific preferences in collection
devices. More studies can be done to assess the utility of different collection devices in
select populations.

Data and Code Availability
De-identified survey responses and source data are available at
doi:10.17632/x2mv2ctm7c.1 and in the supplement.
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METHODS
Ethics
This study was conducted in accordance with an Institutional Review Board protocol
reviewed and approved by the Yale University Human Research Protection Program (IRB
Protocol ID: 2000028394).

Study design
For the initial evaluation of unobserved saliva collection, thirty participants between
the ages of 20 and 80 years were enrolled. Individuals who had previously provided a
saliva sample, who had relevant, career-level laboratory experience, or who were
experiencing symptoms of respiratory infection were excluded from enrollment. Once
informed consent was provided, participants received a collection kit containing (1) the
four saliva collection devices (Figure 1a), (2) corresponding collection instructions, (3) a
biohazard bag, and (4) five alcohol wipes. Participants self-collected four saliva samples
consecutively and in a randomized order. Members of the study team observed these
collections via a video platform with minimal interaction with the study participant. The
observer turned off video and audio on their device for the duration of the four collections
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and provided no instructions on sample collection. Following each collection, both the
observer and the study participant completed a survey about the experience, scoring
responses on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (Figure S1).
An additional 60 participants were recruited into the study through an online, social
media post to evaluate unsupervised at-home saliva collection. Participants were required
to be at least 18 years of age, reside in the contiguous United States with no previous
experience with providing saliva for diagnostic testing. Participants provided demographic
data and were consented via an online form to limit direct contact with study participants,
and to replicate an unsupervised at-home collection as closely as possible. Study
participants were selected from consenting individuals to ensure a diverse range of age
and race. Study participants were mailed an at-home self-collection kit containing a saliva
collection device, a collection tube, collection instructions, a biohazard bag, an alcohol
wipe and a FedEx envelope for sample return (Figure 2a). Samples returned to the
laboratory were stored at 4°C for up to 4 days until testing.

Sample testing
All saliva samples (n = 183) were tested for a region of the SARS-CoV-2 nucleocapsid
gene (N1) and human RNase P (RP) using the SalivaDirect protocol (Vogels et al.). A
laboratory survey assessing the quality of each sample was completed by the technician
during testing.

Statistical analysis
Participant, observer, and laboratory survey questions were tested for internal reliability
with Cronbach’s alpha using R v.4.0.2. Significant statistical differences across the 4
devices were calculated using one-way ANOVA in GraphPad v.8.4.3. Participants who did
not provide a response for all four devices were excluded from the analysis for the
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corresponding question (maximum of 6 for question 10). For the laboratory surveys,
responses to questions 2, 3, and 4 were identical across devices and therefore could not
be assessed using one-way ANOVA. For the at-home self-collection of saliva, the
differences between the bulb pipette and funnel kits were assessed using the MannWhitney test in GraphPad v.9.1.0.

80

REFERENCES
Adamopoulou, M., Vairaktaris, E., Panis, V., Nkenke, E., Neukam, F.W., and
Yapijakis, C. (2008). HPV detection rate in saliva may depend on the immune
system efficiency. In Vivo 22, 599–602.
Bi, C., Mendoza, R., Cheng, H.-T., Pagaspas, G., Gabutan, E.C., Khan, N.,
Hoxie, H., Holmes, K., Gao, N., Lewis, R., et al. (2021). Pooled surveillance
testing program for asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections in K-12 schools and
universities. medRxiv.
Byrne, R.L., Kay, G.A., Kontogianni, K., Brown, L., Collins, A.M., Cuevas, L.E.,
Ferreira, D., Fraser, A.J., Garrod, G., Hill, H., et al. (2020). Saliva offers a
sensitive, specific and non-invasive alternative to upper respiratory swabs for
SARS-CoV-2 diagnosis. medRxiv.
Drobnik, A., Judd, C., Banach, D., Egger, J., Konty, K., and Rude, E. (2011).
Public health implications of rapid hepatitis C screening with an oral swab for
community-based organizations serving high-risk populations. Am. J. Public
Health 101, 2151–2155.
FDA (2018). FDA authorizes first test to aid in detecting a type of herpes virus in
newborns called cytomegalovirus.
Hanson, K.E., Barker, A.P., Hillyard, D.R., Gilmore, N., Barrett, J.W., Orlandi,
R.R., and Shakir, S.M. (2020). Self-Collected Anterior Nasal and Saliva
Specimens versus Health Care Worker-Collected Nasopharyngeal Swabs for the
Molecular Detection of SARS-CoV-2. J. Clin. Microbiol. 58.
Idesawa, M., Sugano, N., Ikeda, K., Oshikawa, M., Takane, M., Seki, K., and Ito,
K. (2004). Detection of Epstein-Barr virus in saliva by real-time PCR. Oral
Microbiol. Immunol. 19, 230–232.

81

Jin, L., Vyse, A., and Brown, D.W.G. (2002). The role of RT-PCR assay of oral
fluid for diagnosis and surveillance of measles, mumps and rubella. Bull. World
Health Organ. 80, 76–77.
Kim, Y.-G., Yun, S.G., Kim, M.Y., Park, K., Cho, C.H., Yoon, S.Y., Nam, M.H.,
Lee, C.K., Cho, Y.-J., and Lim, C.S. (2017). Comparison between Saliva and
Nasopharyngeal Swab Specimens for Detection of Respiratory Viruses by
Multiplex Reverse Transcription-PCR. J. Clin. Microbiol. 55, 226–233.
Korhonen, E.M., Huhtamo, E., Virtala, A.-M.K., Kantele, A., and Vapalahti, O.
(2014). Approach to non-invasive sampling in dengue diagnostics: exploring virus
and NS1 antigen detection in saliva and urine of travelers with dengue. J. Clin.
Virol. 61, 353–358.
Landry, M.L., Criscuolo, J., and Peaper, D.R. (2020). Challenges in use of saliva
for detection of SARS CoV-2 RNA in symptomatic outpatients. J. Clin. Virol. 130,
104567.
Marty, F.M., Chen, K., and Verrill, K.A. (2020). How to Obtain a Nasopharyngeal
Swab Specimen. N. Engl. J. Med. 382, e76.
Ott, I.M., Strine, M.S., Watkins, A.E., Boot, M., Kalinich, C.C., Harden, C.A.,
Vogels, C.B.F., Casanovas-Massana, A., Moore, A.J., Muenker, M.C., et al.
(2021). Stability of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in Nonsupplemented Saliva. Emerg. Infect.
Dis. 27, 1146–1150.
Reynolds, S.J., and Muwonga, J. (2004). OraQuick ADVANCE Rapid HIV-1/2
antibody test. Expert Rev. Mol. Diagn. 4, 587–591.
Robinson, J.L., Lee, B.E., Kothapalli, S., Craig, W.R., and Fox, J.D. (2008). Use
of throat swab or saliva specimens for detection of respiratory viruses in children.
Clin. Infect. Dis. 46, e61–e64.
Siegler, A.J., Hall, E., Luisi, N., Zlotorzynska, M., Wilde, G., Sanchez, T.,
Bradley, H., and Sullivan, P.S. (2020). Willingness to Seek Diagnostic Testing for

82

SARS-CoV-2 With Home, Drive-through, and Clinic-Based Specimen Collection
Locations. Open Forum Infect Dis 7, ofaa269.
Tan, S.H., Allicock, O., Armstrong-Hough, M., and Wyllie, A.L. (2021). Saliva as
a gold-standard sample for SARS-CoV-2 detection. The Lancet Respiratory
Medicine.
Vogels, C., Orchid, M., E., D., Chaney, C., Isabel, M., Grubaugh, N., and Anne,
L. SalivaDirectTM: RNA extraction-free SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics v6
(protocols.io.btdnni5e). Protocols.io.
Vogels, C.B.F., Watkins, A.E., Harden, C.A., Brackney, D.E., Shafer, J., Wang,
J., Caraballo, C., Kalinich, C.C., Ott, I.M., Fauver, J.R., et al. (2020). SalivaDirect:
A Simplified and Flexible Platform to Enhance SARS-CoV-2 Testing Capacity.
Med.
Wong, S.C.Y., Tse, H., Siu, H.K., Kwong, T.S., Chu, M.Y., Yau, F.Y.S., Cheung,
I.Y.Y., Tse, C.W.S., Poon, K.C., Cheung, K.C., et al. (2020). Posterior
Oropharyngeal Saliva for the Detection of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Clin. Infect. Dis. 71, 2939–2946.
Wyllie, A.L., Chu, M.L.J.N., Schellens, M.H.B., van Engelsdorp Gastelaars, J.,
Jansen, M.D., van der Ende, A., Bogaert, D., Sanders, E.A.M., and Trzciński, K.
(2014). Streptococcus pneumoniae in saliva of Dutch primary school children.
PLoS One 9, e102045.
Wyllie, A.L., Fournier, J., Casanovas-Massana, A., Campbell, M., Tokuyama, M.,
Vijayakumar, P., Warren, J.L., Geng, B., Muenker, M.C., Moore, A.J., et al.
(2020). Saliva or Nasopharyngeal Swab Specimens for Detection of SARS-CoV2. N. Engl. J. Med. 383, 1283–1286.
Yapijakis, C., Panis, V., Koufaliotis, N., Yfanti, G., Karachalios, S., Roumeliotou,
A., and Mantzavinos, Z. (2006). Immunological and molecular detection of

83

human immunodeficiency virus in saliva, and comparison with blood testing. Eur.
J. Oral Sci. 114, 175–179.
Yoon, J., Yun, S.G., Nam, J., Choi, S.-H., and Lim, C.S. (2017). The use of saliva
specimens for detection of influenza A and B viruses by rapid influenza diagnostic
tests. J. Virol. Methods 243, 15–19.

84

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
(a) Participant survey

(b) Observer survey

(c) Laboratory survey

Supplementary Figure 1: Survey questions posed to participants, observers, and
laboratory personnel. For the pilot study, parts a), b) and c) were used. For the at-home
collection kit, only a) and c) were used. Responses were given on a scale of 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
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Supplementary Table 1: Internal reliability of survey question measured with
Cronbach’s alpha.
Survey

Observer

Participant

Question
No.

alpha

Question text

1

0.3799

Did the study participant read the instructions?

2

0.9684

Did the study participant appear confident in their ability to
follow the instructions?

3

0.5534

Did the study participant properly wash their hands before
and after sample collection?

4

0.4434

Did the study participant appear to properly follow
instructions for sample collection set up?

5

0.8518

Did the study participant appear to properly follow
instructions for adequate sample collection?

8

0.8256

Did the study participant securely fasten the collection
tube?

9

0.6961

Did the study participant clean down the outside of the
sample tube following collection?

10

0.8208

Did the study participant properly store their sample in the
biohazard bag after collection?

11

0.4703

Did the study participant appear to struggle with any
particular step? If so, explain which.

1

0.5617

2

0.7480

3

0.5382

4

0.4737

Did you read all the instructions carefully prior to collecting
the sample?
Did you feel that you needed help while collecting your
sample?
Do you feel confident that you collected the sample
properly?

Did sample collection cause you physical discomfort?
5

0.2517
Was collecting the sample difficult in general?

6

0.2229

7

0.2251

8

0.7217

Was it difficult to put the appropriate amount of saliva into
the tube?
Did you get any saliva on the outside of the collection
tube?
Did you know what to do if saliva came into contact with
the outside of the collection tube?
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Laboratory

9

0.9411

10

0.9121

1

0

The sample was of sufficient volume (200-500 ul)

2

1

The sample was easy to pipette

3

1

The sample was normal, true saliva

4

1

The sample was free from food particles

5

0.916

The sample was not unusually discolored

Did you understand that if you did not follow the procedure
exactly, you might get a false result?
Did the instructions clearly explain how to collect the
sample?

Supplementary Figure 2: Responses to participant and observer surveys (related
to Figure 1): Mean and standard deviation are marked in pink. Survey data were
analyzed using one-way ANOVA. Responses to two questions (P5 and O5) differed
significantly across devices and are denoted with black boxes. The numbers shown on
the x-axis of those graphs are the mean response value. Abbreviations: P = pipette tip, C
= collection aid, F = funnel, B = bulb pipette.
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Supplementary Figure 3: Responses to laboratory survey. P-values are shown for
questions that could be assessed using one-way ANOVA. Mean and standard
deviation (st. dev.) are shown for questions where responses were identical across
devices. Abbreviations: P = pipette tip, C = collection aid, F = funnel, B = bulb pipette.
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Supplementary Table 2: The majority of internally reliable survey questions did not
differ significantly across collection devices. (a) Analysis of responses for participant
and observer survey questions found to be internally reliable with Cronbach’s alpha. (b)
Analysis of laboratory survey responses. P-values indicate the result of one-way ANOVA.
Mean and standard deviation were reported for questions in which the response
distribution was identical across devices. Abbreviations: No. = number, st. dev. = standard
deviation
a)

Survey

Question No.

P-value

Observer

2

Participant

b)

Question No.

Statistic

Value

0.6668

1

P-value

0.3256

3

0.2541

2

Mean (st. dev.)

4.87 (0.346)

5*

0.0267

3

Mean (st. dev.)

4.87 (0.346)

8

0.2436

4

Mean (st. dev.)

4.77 (0.568)

9

0.2256

5

P-value

0.4862

10

0.3144

6

P-value

0.1192

1

0.4736

2

0.7566

3

0.3315

8

0.5560

9

0.2612

10

0.2002

Supplementary Figure 4: Responses to participant surveys for at home collection
kit. Mean and standard deviation are marked in pink. Survey data were analyzed using
Mann-Whitney. P < 0.05 is significantly different. Abbreviations: F = funnel, B = bulb
pipette.
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Supplementary Figure 5: Responses to laboratory survey. Mean and standard
deviation are marked in pink. P-values are shown for questions that could be assessed
using Mann-Whitney. Ct values over 35 are considered invalid and are highlighted in
gray on L6. Abbreviations: F = funnel, B = bulb pipette
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ABSTRACT
The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in the Pacific Northwest region of
the United States in January, 2020, with subsequent COVID-19 outbreaks detected in all
50 states by early March. To uncover the sources of SARS-CoV-2 introductions and
patterns of spread within the U.S., we sequenced nine viral genomes from early reported
COVID-19 patients in Connecticut. Our phylogenetic analysis places the majority of these
genomes with viruses sequenced from Washington state. By coupling our genomic data
with domestic and international travel patterns, we show that early SARS-CoV-2
transmission in Connecticut was likely driven by domestic introductions. Moreover, the risk
of domestic importation to Connecticut exceeded that of international importation by midMarch regardless of our estimated impacts of federal travel restrictions. This study
provides evidence for widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within the U.S.
and highlights the critical need for local surveillance.

KEYWORDS
Genomic epidemiology, SARS-CoV-2, MinION sequencing, Phylogenetics, Travel Risk,
COVID-19, Coronavirus
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INTRODUCTION
A novel coronavirus, known as SARS-CoV-2, was identified as the cause of an
outbreak of pneumonia in Wuhan, China, in December 2019 (Gorbalenya et al., 2020; Wu
et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020). Travel-associated cases of the disease COVID-19 were
reported outside of China as early as January 13, 2020 and the virus has subsequently
spread to nearly all nations (World Health Organization, 2020a, 2020b). The first detection
of SARS-CoV-2 in the United States was a travel-associated case from Washington state
on January 19, 2020 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020a). The majority
of the early COVID-19 cases in the U.S. were either i) associated with travel to a “highrisk” country or ii) close contacts of previously identified cases, per the testing criteria
adopted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2020b). In response to the risk of more travel-associated cases,
the U.S. placed travel restrictions on multiple countries with SARS-CoV-2 transmission,
including China on January 31, Iran on February 29, and Europe on March 11 (Taylor,
2020). However, community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 was detected in the U.S. in late
February when a California resident contracted the virus despite meeting neither testing
criteria (Moon et al., 2020).
From March 1 to 19, 2020, the number of reported COVID-19 cases in the U.S.
rapidly increased from 74 to 13,677, and the virus was detected in all 50 U.S. states (Dong
et al., 2020). It was recently estimated that the true number of COVID-19 cases in the U.S.
is likely in the tens of thousands (Perkins et al., 2020), suggesting substantial undetected
infections and spread within the country. We hypothesized that, with the growing number
of COVID-19 cases in the U.S. and the large volume of domestic travel, new U.S.
outbreaks are now more likely to result from interstate rather than international spread.
Due to its proximity to several high-volume airports, southern Connecticut is a
suitable location in which to test this hypothesis. By sequencing SARS-CoV-2 from local
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cases and comparing their relatedness to virus genome sequences from other locations,
we used ‘genomic epidemiology’ (Grubaugh et al., 2019a) to identify the likely sources of
SARS-CoV-2 in Connecticut. We supplemented our viral genomic analysis with airline
travel data from major airports in southern New England to estimate the risk of domestic
and international importation therein. Our data suggest that the risk of domestic
importation of SARS-CoV-2 into this region far outweighs that of international introductions
regardless of federal travel restrictions, and find evidence for coast-to-coast U.S. SARSCoV-2 spread.
RESULTS
Phylogenetic clustering of Connecticut SARS-CoV-2 genomes demonstrates
interstate spread
To delineate the roles of domestic and international virus spread in the emergence
of new U.S. COVID-19 outbreaks, we sequenced SARS-CoV-2 viruses collected from
cases identified in Connecticut. Our phylogenetic analyses showed that the outbreak in
Connecticut was caused by multiple virus introductions and that most of these viruses
were related to those sequenced from other U.S. states rather than international locations
(Figure 1).
We sequenced SARS-CoV-2 genomes from nine of the first COVID-19 cases
reported in Connecticut (CT), with sample collection dating from March 6-14, 2020 (Data
S1). These individuals are residents of eight different cities in Connecticut. According to
the Connecticut State Department of Public Health, none of the cases were associated
with international travel. Using our amplicon sequencing approach, ‘PrimalSeq’ (Grubaugh
et al., 2019b; Quick et al., 2017), with the portable Oxford Nanopore Technologies (ONT)
MinION platform, we generated the first SARS-CoV-2 genome approximately 14 hours
after receiving the sample (CT-Yale-006), demonstrating our ability to perform near real-
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time clinical sequencing and bioinformatics. Our complete workflow included RNA
extraction, PCR testing, validation of PCR results, library preparation, sequencing, and
live base calling and read mapping. We shared the genomes of these viruses publicly as
we generated them (GISAID EPI_ISL_416416-416424). We combined our genomes with
other publicly available sequences for a final dataset of 168 SARS-CoV-2 genomes
(Figure 1, Data S2). The dataset can be visualized on our ‘community’ Nextstrain page
(https://nextstrain.org/community/grubaughlab/CT-SARS-CoV-2/paper1).
We built phylogenetic trees using a maximum likelihood reconstruction approach,
and we used shared nucleotide substitutions to assess clade support (Figure 1, Data S3).
Our first nine SARS-CoV-2 genomes clustered into three distinct phylogenetic clades,
indicating multiple independent virus introductions into Connecticut. Our SARS-CoV-2
genome CT-Yale-001 clusters closely with other viruses sequenced from Asia (China),
while the close genetic relatedness of genomes from Europe and Washington state in the
clade that contains CT-Yale-006 makes it difficult to track the origins of this virus (Figure
1A). Regardless, neither of the CT-Yale-001 or CT-Yale-006 COVID-19 cases were travelassociated, which indicates that these patients were part of domestic transmission chains
that stemmed from undetected introductions. The other seven SARS-CoV-2 genomes
clustered with a large, primarily U.S. clade, within which the majority of genomes were
sequenced from cases in Washington state (Figure 1B). Due to a paucity of SARS-CoV2 genomes from other regions within the U.S., we could not determine the exact domestic
origin of these viruses in Connecticut. We also cannot yet determine whether the higher
number of substitutions observed in CT-Yale-007 and CT-Yale-008 (Figure 1B) compared
to the other Connecticut virus genomes within this clade was the result of multiple
introductions or of significant undersampling. However, given that seven of our nine
Connecticut SARS-CoV-2 genomes fell within this clade versus the many other
international clades, these were most likely the result of a common domestic source(s)
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rather than repeated international introductions. Importantly, our data indicate that by early
to mid March there had already been interstate spread during the early COVID-19
epidemic in the U.S.
A

Global SARS-CoV-2
Asia (29)
Oceania (1)
Europe (27)
South America (1)
Minnesota (2)
Illinois (2)
Wisconsin (1)

Washington (79)
California (10)
Texas (1)
Arizona (1)
Massachusetts (1)
Connecticut (9)
C17747T
A17858G

C18060T
C8782T, T28144C

CT-Yale-006

C241T, C3037T, C14408T, A23403G

C186T CT-Yale-001

0

B

2

4

6

8

10

CT-Yale-002
CT-Yale-003

U.S. SARS-CoV-2 clade
1

67

7

CT-Yale-010 CT-Yale-009

CT-Yale-008

CT-Yale-007

C17747T
A17858G
C18060T
CT-Yale-005

2

3

4

5
6
7
Nucleotide differences from the root

8

9

10

Figure 1: The COVID-19 outbreak in Connecticut is phylogenetically linked to SARSCoV-2 from Washington. (A) We constructed a maximum-likelihood tree using 168
global SARS-CoV-2 protein coding sequences, including 9 sequences from COVID-19
patients identified in Connecticut from March 6-14, 2020. The total number of nucleotide
differences from the root of the tree quantifies evolution since the putative SARS-CoV-2
ancestor. We included clade-defining nucleotide substitutions to directly show the
evidence supporting phylogenetic clustering. The number of SARS-CoV-2 genomes used
in this phylogenetic tree from each location is shown in parenthesis. (B) We enlarged the
U.S. clade consisting primarily of SARS-CoV-2 sequences from Washington state and
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Connecticut. The map shows the location and number of SARS-CoV-2 genomes that
cluster within this clade. The MinION sequencing statistics are enumerated in Data S1,
and the SARS-CoV-2 sequences used and author acknowledgements can be found in
Data S2. A root-to-tip plot showing the genetic diversity and substitution rate of the data
can be found in Figure S1. The genomic data can be visualized and interacted with at:
https://nextstrain.org/community/grubaughlab/CT-SARS-CoV-2/paper1.
Travel and epidemiological patterns reveal significant domestic importation risk
Our phylogenetic analysis shows that the COVID-19 outbreak in Connecticut was
driven, in part, by domestic virus introductions. To compare the roles of interstate and
international SARS-CoV-2 spread in the U.S., we used airline travel data and the
epidemiological dynamics in regions where travel routes originated to evaluate importation
risk. We found that, due to the large volume of daily domestic air passengers, the dominant
importation risk into the Connecticut region switched from international to domestic by
early to mid March (Figure 2).
We first estimated daily passenger volumes arriving in the region from the five
countries (China, Italy, Iran, Spain, and Germany) and out-of-region states (Washington,
California, Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana) that have reported the most COVID-19 cases
to date (Figure 2A-D). By March 18, the five countries comprised 78% of reported nonUS cases while the five states comprised 48% of reported domestic cases outside of CT
and NY. To this end, we collected passenger volumes arriving in three major airports in
southern New England: Bradley International Airport (BDL; Hartford, Connecticut),
General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS; Boston, Massachusetts),
and John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK; New York, New York; Figure 2B). As
travel data for 2020 are not yet available, we calculated the total passenger volume from
each origin and destination pair between January and March, 2019, and estimated the
number of daily passengers. We found that the daily domestic passenger volumes were
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~100 times greater than international in Hartford, ~10 times greater in Boston, and ~4
times greater in New York in our dataset (Figure 2B).
By combining daily passenger volumes (Figure 2B) with COVID-19 prevalence at
the travel route origin (Figure 2C-D) and accounting for differences in reporting rates, we
found that both domestic and international SARS-CoV-2 importation risk started to
increase dramatically at the beginning of March, 2020 (Figure 2E). Without accounting for
the effects of international travel restrictions, our estimated domestic importation risk from
the selected five U.S. states surpassed international importation risk by March 10. Using
previous assumptions around travel restrictions (Chinazzi et al., 2020), we also modeled
two scenarios where federal travel restrictions reduced passenger volume by 40% and by
90% from the restricted countries (Figure 2E). Due to the overall low prevalence of
COVID-19 in China, we did not find any significant effects of travel restrictions from China
that were enacted on February 1st (Data S3). Also, we did not find significant changes to
the importation risk following travel restrictions from Iran on March 1, likely due to the
relatively small number of passengers arriving from that country (Data S3). While we did
find a dramatic decrease in international importation risk following the restrictions on travel
from Europe (March 13), this decrease occurred after our estimates of domestic travel
importation risk had already surpassed that of international importation (Figure 2E). The
dramatic rises in both domestic and international importation risk preceded the state-wide
COVID-19 outbreak in Connecticut (Figure 2E), and the recent increase in risk of
domestic importation may give rise to new outbreaks in the region.
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Figure 2: Domestic outbreaks and travel are a rising source of SARS-CoV-2
importation risk. (A) To compare the relative risks of SARS-CoV-2 importations from
domestic and international sources, we selected five international (China, Italy, Iran,
Spain, and Germany) and out-of-region U.S. states (Washington, California, Florida,
Illinois, and Louisiana) with the highest number of reported COVID-19 cases as of March
19, 2020. (B) We selected three international airports in the region that are commonly
used by Connecticut residents: Hartford (BDL), Boston (BOS), and New York (JFK). We
used data from January to March, 2019, to estimate relative differences in daily air
passenger volumes from the selected origins to the airport destinations. These daily
estimates were then combined by either international or domestic travel. (C-D) The
cumulative number of daily COVID-19 cases were divided by 100,000 population to
calculate normalized disease prevalence for each location. (E) We calculated importation
risk by modelling the number of daily prevalent COVID-19 cases in each potential
importation source and then estimating the number of infected travelers using the daily air
travel volume from each location. Data, criteria, and analyses used to create this figure
can be found in Data S3.
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DISCUSSION
The combined results of our genomic epidemiology and travel pattern analyses
suggest that domestic spread recently became a significant source of new SARS-CoV-2
infections in the U.S. We find strong evidence that outbreaks on the East Coast
(Connecticut) are linked to outbreaks on the West Coast (Washington), demonstrating that
trans-continental spread has already occured. As of March 25, there are >1000 SARSCoV-2 genomes sequenced from around the world, including >350 from the U.S.
(https://nextstrain.org/ncov); however most of the latter were obtained from a small
number of U.S. states. Therefore, we cannot determine the exact origins of the viral
introductions into Connecticut. Recent domestic travel history of the nine reported cases
was not available, but it is unlikely that all of the infections originated in Washington state.
Furthermore, due to low genetic diversity between these early sequences from
Connecticut and Washington, we cannot yet quantify the rate at which the virus may be
spreading between the U.S. coasts or whether an introduction from a common source is
responsible for phylogenetic grouping. There are likely other large, multi-state
phylogenetic SARS-CoV-2 clades that exist in the U.S. As testing capacity increases and
more viral genome sequences become available from new locations, more granular
reconstructions of virus spread throughout the U.S. will be possible (Grubaugh et al.,
2019a). Specifically, elucidating the phylogenetic relationship of viral genomes collected
in Connecticut to those collected in neighboring states, especially states with a high
burden of disease like New York, will improve our understanding of critical interstate
dynamics.
Our estimates of domestic importation risk are likely conservative despite some
important limitations in our air travel analysis. Because we do not have access to current
airline data, we could not exactly quantify the impact of government restrictions on
international travel. In addition, even without explicit government restrictions, general
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social distancing and work-from-home guidelines are reducing all airline travel. By using
airline data available from 2019, we did not account for these decreases in either our
international or domestic travel patterns. While such variations may lower our domestic
risk estimates, we also did not account for the large volumes of regional automobile and
rail travel, especially along the corridor that connects Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C. to Connecticut. We do not believe that
Connecticut is more closely connected to its neighbors than states in other regions of the
country. As such, our risk estimates indicate that this interconnectedness will perpetuate
the domestic spread of SARS-CoV-2 and that domestic spread will likely become the
primary source of new infections in the U.S..
We argue that, though simplistic, our model demonstrates the urgent need to focus
control efforts in the U.S. on preventing further domestic virus spread. As this epidemic
progresses, domestic introductions of the virus could undermine control efforts in areas
that have successfully mitigated local transmission. In China, local outbreak dynamics
were highly correlated with travel between Wuhan and the outbreak dynamics therein
during the early months of the epidemic (Kraemer et al., 2020). Similarly, if interstate
introductions are not curtailed in the U.S. with improved surveillance measures, more
robust diagnostic capabilities, and proper clinical care, quelling local transmission within
states will be a Sisyphean task. We therefore propose that a unified effort to detect and
prevent new COVID-19 cases will be essential for mitigating the risk of future domestic
outbreaks. This effort must ensure that states have sufficient personal protective
equipment, sample collection materials, and testing reagents, as these supplies enable
effective surveillance. Finally, state- and local-level policymakers must recognize that the
health and well-being of their constituents are contingent on that of the nation. If spread
between states is now occurring, as our results indicate, the U.S. will struggle to control
COVID-19 in the absence of a unified surveillance strategy.
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STAR Methods
Resource Availability
Lead Contact
Further information and requests for data, resources, and reagents should be directed to
and

will

be

fulfilled

by

the

Lead

Contact,

Nathan

D.

Grubaugh

(nathan.grubaugh@yale.edu).

Materials Availability
This study did not generate new unique reagents, but raw data and code generated as
part of this research can be found in the Supplemental Files, as well as on public
resources as specified in the Data and Code Availability section below.

Data and Code Availability
The SARS-CoV-2 sequence data generated here can be found using the NCBI BioProject:
(PRJNA614976) and GISAID (EPI_ISL_416416-416424). Sequencing data has been
made available via SRA. Data used to create the figures can be found in the supplemental
files. The interactive Nextstain page to visualize the genomic data can be found at:
https://nextstrain.org/community/grubaughlab/CT-SARS-CoV-2/paper1. The raw data,
results, and analyses can be found at: https://github.com/grubaughlab/CT-SARS-CoV-2.

Experimental Model and Subject Details
Ethics Statement
Residual de-identified nasopharyngeal samples testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 by
reverse-transcriptase quantitative (RT-q)PCR were obtained from the Yale-New Haven
Hospital Clinical Virology Laboratory or the Connecticut State Department of Public
Health. In accordance with the guidelines of the Yale Human Investigations Committee
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and the Connecticut State Department of Public Health, this work with de-identified
samples is considered non-human subjects research. All samples were de-identified
before receipt by the study investigators.

Method Details
Sample collection and processing
Samples for this study were collected during an early testing phase by the Connecticut
State Department of Public Health or the Yale Clinical Virology Laboratory at the Yale
School of Medicine. None of the cases that we sequenced in this study were associated
with international travel. All samples included in this study had CT values less than 35,
sufficient volume of RNA for library preparation, and were collected by March 14. As early
samples were crucial for validating PCR diagnostics in multiple laboratories, the number
of samples meeting these criteria were limited. Nasopharyngeal swabs were collected
from patients presenting with symptoms of SARS-CoV-2 infection at multiple medical
centers in Connecticut. These patients are all Connecticut residents, but we do not have
access to location data associated with each of these early SARS-CoV-2 genomes to
avoid patient identification. Swabs were placed in virus transport media (BD Universal
Viral Transport Medium) immediately upon collection. Samples (200 µL) were subjected
to total nucleic acid extraction using the NUCLISENS easyMAG platform (BioMérieux,
France) at the Yale Clinical Virology Laboratory. The recommended CDC RT-qPCR assay
was used to test for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2020c). A total of 10 samples from 10 different individuals met our inclusion
criteria and were selected to to move forward with next generation sequencing (NGS). Of
these, we were successfully able to generate sequencing libraries from nine samples.

SARS-CoV-2 Sequencing
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SARS-CoV-2 positive samples were processed for NGS using a highly multiplexed
PCR amplicon approach for sequencing on the Oxford Nanopore Technologies (ONT;
Oxford, United Kingdom) MinION using the V1 primer pools (Quick et al., 2017).
Sequencing libraries were barcoded and multiplexed using the Ligation Sequencing Kit
and Native Barcoding Expansion pack (ONT) following the ARTIC Network’s library
preparation protocol (V1 primers) (Quick, 2020) with the following minor modifications:
cDNA was generated with SuperScriptIV VILO Master Mix (ThermoFisher Scientific,
Waltham, MA, USA), a total of 20 ng of each sample was used as input into end repair,
end repair incubation time was increased to 25 minutes followed by a 1:1 bead-based
clean up, and Blunt/TA ligase (New England Biolabs, Ipswich, MA, USA) was used to
ligate barcodes to each sample. cDNA synthesis and amplicon generation was performed
concurrently for each sample. Samples were processed by CT value to reduce the
likelihood of contamination from high titer samples to low titer samples. Barcoding, adaptor
ligation, and sequencing was performed on samples with CT values between 25-35 (low
titer group) prior to samples with CT values below 25 (high titer group) (Data S1). Two
samples, Yale-006 and Yale-007, were diluted 1:100 in nuclease-free water prior to cDNA
synthesis. A no template control was created at the cDNA synthesis step and amplicon
generation step to detect cross-contamination between samples. Controls were barcoded
and sequenced with both the high and low titer sample groups.
A total of 24 ng of the low titer group was loaded onto a MinION R9.4.1 flow cell
and sequenced for a total of 5.5 hours and generated 2.1 million reads. The flow cell was
nuclease treated, flushed, and primed prior to loading 25 ng of the high titer group library.
These samples were sequenced for a total of 9 hours and generated 1.4 million reads
(Data S1). The RAMPART software from the ARTIC Network was used to monitor the
sequencing run to estimate the depth of coverage across the genome for each barcoded
sample in both runs https://github.com/artic-network/rampart). Following completion of the
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sequencing runs, .fast5 files were basecalled with Guppy (v3.5.1, ONT) using the high
accuracy module. Basecalling was performed on a single GPU node on the Yale HPC.
Consensus genomes were generated for input into phylogenetic analysis according to the
ARTIC Network bioinformatic pipeline (Artic Network). Variants in the consensus genomes
were called using nanopolish per the bioinformatic pipeline (Loman et al., 2015).
Amplicons that were not sequenced to depth of 20x were not included in the final
consensus genome, and these positions are represented by stretches of NNN’s (Data
S1).

Phylogenetic analysis
To investigate the origin and diversity of SARS-CoV-2 in Connecticut, we compiled a
dataset of our nine genomes with another 159 representative sample of SARS-CoV-2
genomes that were available from GenBank (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/sarscov-2-seqs/) and GISAID (https://www.gisaid.org/). See Data S2 for a list of sequences
and acknowledgements to the originating and submitting labs. No data that was only
released

on

GISAID

was

used

without

consent

from

the

authors

(see

Acknowledgements). We aligned consensus genomes using the augur toolkit version
6.4.2 (Hadfield et al., 2018). Specifically, we aligned sequences using mafft (Katoh et al.,
2002), masked sites at the 5’ and 3’ ends of the alignment as well as a small number of
sites that likely vary due to assembly artefacts (see https://github.com/nextstrain/ncov),
and reconstructed a phylogeny using IQ-Tree (Nguyen et al., 2015). These trees are
further processed using augur and treetime to add ancestral reconstructions (Sagulenko
et al., 2018). The tree is rooted on the ancestor of the two genomes "Wuhan-Hu-1/2019”
and “Wuhan/WH01/2019". Sequences in this sample differ from the root by 10 or fewer
nucleotide substitutions. Bootstrap values are not a meaningful measure of branch support
in this case. Here, many of the branches are supported by one substitution, which would
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correspond to a bootstrap support of 0.63. For a branch supported by two substitutions
the bootstrap support value would correspondingly be 0.86. Given this approximate oneto-one mapping between bootstrap values and the number of substitutions, we directly
show mutations supporting the major splits in the tree as it is more informative. The
substitutions defining these clades are compatible with the tree topology and are not
homoplastic. The probability that all clade defining substitutions arose multiple times
independently in a manner compatible with the tree topology is vanishingly small. For
example, with a rate of 2 nucleotide substitutions per month in a genome of length
approximately 29’000 bases, the probability of this happening for any pair of six sister
clades within a 2 month time frame is <0.01. A root-to-tip plot can be found in Figure S1.
The data can be visualized at: https://nextstrain.org/community/grubaughlab/CT-SARSCoV-2/paper1.

International and U.S. COVID-19 cases
Daily COVID-19 cases from international locations were obtained from the European
Centre

for

Disease

Prevention

and

Control

via

Our

World

in

Data

(https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus-source-data). International data were accessed
on March 19, 2020. Daily COVID-19 cases from Connecticut and other U.S. locations
(Washington, California, Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana) were obtained from the repository
(https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19) hosted by the Center for Systems
Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University (Dong et al., 2020). These
represent the international and out-of-region domestic (i.e. excluding New York,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey) locations with the most reported COVID-19 cases.

Air passenger volumes
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To investigate the domestic and international spread of SARS-CoV-2, we obtained air
passenger

volumes

from

the

International

Air

Transport

Association

(IATA;

https://www.iata.org/pages/default.aspx). IATA data consists of global ticket sales, which
account for true origins and final destinations, and represents 90% of all commercial
flights. We obtained the monthly number of number of passengers traveling by air from
five international (China, Italy, Iran, Spain, and Germany) and five U.S. locations
(Washington, California, Florida, Illinois, and Louisiana) to airports that are commonly
used by Connecticutians: Bradley International Airport (BDL, Hartford, Connecticut;
ranked

53rd

in

U.S.

in

yearly

passenger

volume;

https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/),
General Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS, Boston, Massachusetts;
ranked 16th), and John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK, New York, New York;
ranked 6th). Air passenger data from 2020 is not currently available; thus, we used data
from January to March 2019 to represent general trends in passenger volumes, as done
previously (Bogoch et al., 2020). We took the average of the 3-month passenger volumes
to estimate the daily number of travelers entering each airport from the specified origin.
To account for passenger reductions following U.S. government alerts and restrictions
(Taylor, 2020), we modeled two scenarios: a 40% reduction in passenger volume and a
90% reduction in passenger volume. These thresholds were determined based on
previously reported estimates and assumptions around travel restrictions (Chinazzi et al.,
2020).

Travel importation risk estimates
We estimated the true number of incident cases per day by adjusting the number
of reported incident cases to reflect the ascertainment period and reporting rate using:
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Eq. 1
𝐼𝑡−𝑑−1 =

𝐶𝑡
𝜌

where Ct is the number of reported incident cases of COVID-19 on day t, d is the number
of days from symptom onset to testing, and ρ is the reporting rate.
We assumed a constant ascertainment period of d=5 days between symptom
onset and testing (Ferguson et al., 2020). Because of the evidence of pre-symptomatic
transmission (Tindale et al., 2020), we also assumed that cases become infectious one
day before symptom onset. To account for substantial uncertainty around reporting rates,
we assigned different reporting rates to individual locations based on the testing criteria
enacted in that location (Niehus et al., 2020). For each country and state, we first extracted
testing criteria from the department or ministry of health website. We assumed that
countries or states with similar testing criteria policies captured similar proportions of true
infections. Using the respective testing criteria, we categorized countries or states as
having narrow, moderate, or broad testing levels. We then assigned reporting rates to
each testing level by using the mean and 95% confidence interval of the reporting rate
estimated by Nishiura et al. (Nishiura et al., 2020): 0.092 (95% CI= 0.05–0.20). The
reporting rate for the broadest testing level, ρ=0.20, also corresponded to the reporting
rate in Mainland China (Chinazzi et al., 2020). We thus assigned Iran, Florida,
Washington, and Illinois to a “narrow” testing level (ρ=0.05); Spain, Italy, and Louisiana to
a “moderate'' testing level (ρ=0.092); and China, Germany, and California to a “broad”
testing level (ρ=0.20, Data S2, “testing-criteria”).
To estimate the number of prevalent infectious individuals on day t (Pt), we
multiplied the number of incident infections up to day t by the probability that an individual
who became infectious on day i was still infectious on day t:
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Eq. 2
𝑡−1

𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑖 (1 − 𝛾(𝑡 − 𝑖)) + 𝐼𝑡
𝑖=1

Where γ(t-i) is the cumulative distribution function of the infectious period. We modeled
the infectious period as gamma distribution with mean 7 days and standard deviation 4.5
days which aligns with other modeling studies (Prem et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2020).
We assumed that cases would not travel once they were diagnosed and therefore
removed them from our estimate of infectious travelers (Tt):

Eq. 3
𝑡−5

𝑡−1

𝑇𝑡 = ∑(𝐼𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖+𝑑+1 )(1 − 𝛾(𝑡 − 𝑖)) + ∑ 𝐼𝑖 (1 − 𝛾(𝑡 − 𝑖)) + 𝐼𝑡
𝑖=1

𝑖=𝑡−4

The first term of Equation 3 accounts for the assumption that some cases had been
diagnosed by day t and thus would not travel. The second and third terms capture cases
who are infectious on day t and have not yet been diagnosed.
We calculated daily risk of importation as a function of the population-adjusted
density of infectious travelers and passenger volume:

Eq. 4
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 =

𝑇𝑡
∗ 𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝐴
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where Tt is the number of infectious travelers on day t, popA is the population of location
A, and nt is the number of passengers traveling from each location to southern New
England on day t. We summed the calculated risk across the three airports (BDL, BOS,
JFK) and then across domestic and international travelers to arrive at our final estimates.

Maps
The maps presented in our figures were generated using shape files from Natural Earth
(http://www.naturalearthdata.com/). The basemaps are open source and freely available
to anyone.

Quantification and Statistical Analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using R version 3.5.2 (R Core Team, 2017) and are
described in the figure legends and in the method details.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Supplementary Figure 1: Root-to-Tip Plot Showing the Evolutionary Rate of the
SARS-CoV-2 Genomes in Our Dataset, Related to Figure 1
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ABSTRACT
Emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants have shaped the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic
and the public health discourse around effective control measures. Evaluating the public
health threat posed by a new variant is essential for appropriately adapting response
efforts when community transmission is detected. However, this assessment requires that
a true comparison can be made between the new variant and its predecessors because
factors other than the virus genotype may influence spread and transmission. In this study,
we develop a framework that integrates genomic surveillance data to estimate the relative
effective reproduction number (Rt) of co-circulating lineages. We use Connecticut, a state
in the northeastern United States in which the SARS-CoV-2 variants B.1.1.7 and B.1.526
co-circulated in early 2021, as a case study for implementing this framework. We find that
the Rt of B.1.1.7 was 6-10% larger than that of B.1.526 in Connecticut in the midst of a
COVID-19 vaccination campaign. To assess the generalizability of this framework, we
apply it to genomic surveillance data from New York City and observe the same trend.
Finally, we use discrete phylogeography to demonstrate that while both variants were
introduced into Connecticut at comparable frequencies, clades that resulted from
introductions of B.1.1.7 were larger than those resulting from B.1.526 introductions. Our
framework, which uses open-source methods requiring minimal computational resources,
may be used to monitor near real-time variant dynamics in a myriad of settings.

INTRODUCTION
The emergence of novel SARS-CoV-2 variants has shaped the second year of the
COVID-19 pandemic1–3 and illustrated the role of genomic epidemiology in facilitating an
appropriate, effective, and timely public health response 4. In particular, genomic
epidemiology can determine the source and frequency of new variant introductions into a
community, thus indicating where additional surveillance is needed. However, this
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assessment requires the prior establishment of a robust genomic surveillance system.
Once community transmission is documented, the efficacy of control methods should be
re-evaluated by assessing the public health risk posed by the variant in comparison to
other variants in circulation. This second objective is particularly challenging because
factors other than the virus genotype influence its transmission and spread 5–7. Specifically,
competition between virus lineages and local levels of immunity could impact the relative
success of a new variant compared to its predecessors. Therefore, we should compare
lineages that have emerged concurrently in the same human and virus population as the
variant under scrutiny. For an accurate risk assessment of emerging variants, we must
control for the epidemiological context. Instances in which these criteria are met are both
rare and exceptionally informative.
At the beginning of 2021 two variants of public health significance synchronously
emerged in Connecticut, a United States (US) state with high rates of SARS-CoV-2
genomic surveillance. SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.526 (designated as variant ‘iota’) was
detected in New York in December 20208. Shortly thereafter, cases of B.1.1.7 (‘alpha’),
the variant first characterized in the United Kingdom, were identified in the northeastern
US. Due to evidence collected in the United Kingdom that this variant was more
transmissible than other lineages, B.1.1.7 was expected to become dominant in the US
by March9–11. Instead, B.1.526 co-circulated in New York with B.1.1.7 and may have
slowed the decline of COVID-19 incidence in New York City12. Both variants were initially
detected in Connecticut within the first two weeks of January 2021, likely introduced by
infected travelers, and continued to co-circulate in the state for months10.
In this study, we develop a framework to measure the relative transmissibility of
B.1.1.7 and B.1.526 by combining epidemiological and genomic data collected in
Connecticut between January and May 2021. We first measure the relative transmissibility
of these variants by modeling their growth rates and time-varying effective reproduction
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numbers following their emergence. Both metrics indicate that B.1.1.7 was 6-10% more
transmissible than B.1.526 when these variants circulated in the same population.
Interestingly, these findings are consistent with the relationship we observed in New York
City where B.1.526 was established before B.1.1.7. We next estimate the timing, number,
and clade size following sustained introductions of each variant into Connecticut to
determine whether the apparent fitness advantage we observed for B.1.1.7 could be
attributed to a higher rate of introductions over our study period rather than higher fitness.
We use discrete phylogeography to infer the source and number of introductions for each
variant and find that both were introduced at comparable rates, but the size of clades
precipitated by introductions of B.1.1.7 were on average larger than those formed from
introductions of B.1.526. The concordance of our epidemiological and phylodynamic
results indicate that B.1.1.7 had a fitness advantage over B.1.526 when potentially
confounding factors were controlled. Through this case study, we demonstrate that our
framework, which utilizes open-source computational methods, is a robust and useful tool
for continually monitoring the dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 variants in near real time.

RESULTS
Rapid rise in B.1.1.7 and B.1.526 prevalence in Connecticut and New York City.
The rapid spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineages B.1.1.7 in the United Kingdom 13 and
B.1.526 (including sublineages B.1.526.1 and B.1.526.2) in New York City12,14 suggested
that these variants have a competitive advantage over other SARS-CoV-2 lineages. Both
variants are defined by key amino acid substitutions in the spike protein that may
contribute to this advantage. We therefore hypothesized that B.1.1.7 and B.1.526 would
compete for dominance in Connecticut soon after they emerged. To test this hypothesis,
we measured the daily frequencies and growth rates of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526 in Connecticut
and compared these patterns to those observed in New York City (Fig. 1). Our analysis
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revealed that B.1.1.7 and B.1.526 displaced nearly all other lineages circulating in both
regions within three months of emergence. Moreover, the frequency of B.1.1.7 grew at a
faster rate than B.1.526.
Unlike the situation in New York City, which may be the origin of B.1.526, B.1.1.7
and B.1.526 emerged concurrently in Connecticut through infected travelers. Connecticut
is a state in the northeast US, bordered by Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New York
(Fig. 1a, map). These states experienced synchronous waves of COVID-19 incidence
throughout the pandemic (Fig. 1a, graphs). We first detected B.1.1.7 in Connecticut on
January 6, 2021 (sample collection date) in New Haven County

10

, and we detected the

first B.1.526 soon after on January 14, 2021.
As of early May 2021, B.1.526 contains two sublineages, and SARS-CoV-2
sequences belonging to this clade can be classified as either B.1.526, B.1.526.1, or
B.1.526.2 (Supplementary Fig. 1). This clade has a poorly resolved phylogenetic
relationship and the lineages have different patterns of three key amino acid substitutions
in the spike gene: L452R, S477N, and E484K (Supplementary Fig. 1a)12,14–17. B.1.526
does not include the L452R substitution, but ~20% include S477N and ~75% include
E484K3,18; B.1.526.1 only includes L452R; B.1.526.2 only includes S477N. The CDC
classified B.1.526 and B.1.526.1 as ‘Variants of Interest’ (VOI), but did not include
B.1.526.2 in this category15. Even with these ostensibly important molecular differences,
all three lineages had similar epidemiological dynamics and co-circulated in Connecticut
since February 2021 at relatively equal frequencies (Supplementary Fig. 1b). We
therefore elected to analyze the dynamics of B.1.526, B.1.526.1, and B.1.526.2
collectively, which we hereafter refer to as B.1.526*.
To compare the relative growth rates of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* over time, we
collected and sequenced 2,951 whole SARS-CoV-2 genomes from Connecticut between
November 30, 2020 and May 9, 2021 using an unbiased sampling approach. Specifically,
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we excluded genomes that were targeted for sequencing because of spike-gene target
failure or any other anomaly. We assigned PANGO lineages to each genome 19 and
created a general lineage classification with three categories: ‘B.1.1.7’, ‘B.1.526*’, or
‘other’. The ‘other’ lineages primarily include B.1.2, B.1.517, B.1.575, and B.1.243, but
they also include low frequencies of several ‘Variants of Concern’ (VOCs) and VOIs
(Supplementary Table 1). We calculated a rolling 7-day average for each general lineage
classification to mitigate the impact of daily reporting trends.
In southern Connecticut, B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* collectively rose to above 50%
prevalence by March 2021, but the relative prevalence of these variants differed across
the region (Fig. 1c). Due to the close proximity of New Haven and Fairfield counties to
New York City and the large volume of travelers between New York City and southern
Connecticut, we hypothesized that the frequency patterns in Connecticut would reflect
those observed in New York City. We therefore modeled the logistic growth of each variant
across locations (Fig. 1d). While the growth rates of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* were
comparable and consistently higher than all other lineages (Fig. 1e), we observed
heterogeneity in the relative growth of these variants. The estimated logistic growth rate
of B.1.1.7 was twice that of B.1.526* in New Haven County (B.1.1.7 = 0.042, B.1.526* =
0.021) and New York City (B.1.1.7 = 0.035, B.1.526* = 0.016). The rate of B.1.1.7. growth
was 1.37 times that of B.1.526* in Fairfield County (B.1.1.7 = 0.037, B.1.526* = 0.028).
These findings suggest that B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* had a competitive fitness advantage
over their predecessors, and, once established, B.1.1.7 may have spread more quickly
than B.1.526*. This pattern was particularly noticeable in New York City, where B.1.526*
emerged first but increased in frequency more slowly than B.1.1.7 (Fig. 1c).
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Figure 1: B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* dominated the circulating SARS-CoV-2 populations
in Connecticut and New York City in early 2021. (a) Trends in COVID-19 incidence
were consistent across northeastern states throughout the pandemic. (map) Connecticut
(teal) is bordered by New York, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. New York City is less
than 50 miles from Fairfield County. Weekly COVID-19 incidence was tabulated according
to the Johns Hopkins COVID-19 portal (https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19).
Shapefile source: United States Census Bureau. (b) New Haven County led the state in
the percentage of COVID-19 cases sequenced between November 30, 2020 and May 9,
2021 (3.33%). During this period, 0.51% of COVID-19 cases in New York City were
sequenced. Genomes that were collected through targeted variant screening (e.g., spikegene target failure) were excluded from this analysis. Shapefile source: the Connecticut
Department of Energy & Environmental Protection (DEEP) Geographic Information
Systems Open Data Website. (c) Together, B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* variants displaced nearly
all other SARS-CoV-2 lineages in New Haven County (n = 2,086), Fairfield County (n =
612), and New York City (n = 4,528). The lineages of sequenced viruses were assigned
using pangolin v.2.4.2. The lineages B.1.526, B.1.526.1, and B.1.526.2 were assigned to
the general lineage category ‘B.1.526*’. We calculated a 7-day rolling average for the
proportion of B.1.1.7, B.1526*, and ‘other’ SARS-CoV-2 lineages sequenced in our
dataset. (d) Logistic regression of the growth rates per lineage using Rv.4.0.1. Line colors
correspond to the legend in (c). (e) Slope of logistic growth shown in (d). Bar colors
correspond to the legend in (c).
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Evidence that B.1.1.7 is more transmissible than B.1.526*
The relative changes in frequency and growth rates reflected by our sequencing
data indicated that B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* outcompeted other co-circulating SARS-CoV-2
lineages (Fig. 1). They also provided some evidence that the prevalence of B.1.1.7
increased at a faster rate than that of B.1.526* in three different populations. However,
these observations did not account for COVID-19 incidence in each population. Over the
duration of our study period, the weekly number of reported COVID-19 cases in
Connecticut declined, peaking at 53 cases per 10,000 residents and falling to 9 cases per
10,000 residents with fluctuations in between. To more accurately measure the relative
transmissibility of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526*, we combined the frequency estimates from our
genomic data with daily reported COVID-19 cases and estimated the effective
reproduction numbers (Rt), which quantifies the average number of secondary cases from
a primary infection, for each variant (Fig. 2). In New Haven County, Connecticut, we found
that B.1.1.7 was 6-10% more transmissible than B.1.526* (Fig. 2c). We obtained
consistent albeit noisier results in New York City, providing further evidence that B.1.1.7
was more transmissible than B.1.526* (Fig. 2f).
We estimated Rt for B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* by extrapolating the variant frequencies
among sequenced cases to the total number of reported cases in New Haven County (Fig.
2a). We selected New Haven County because we sequenced a higher percentage of
cases compared to other counties in Connecticut (Fig. 1b), providing us with better
estimates. We assumed that the 7-day rolling average of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* in our
dataset was representative of the true prevalence of these variants in the population
because these datasets were compiled using genomes collected from the same sources.
Therefore, we assumed that any biases introduced through subsampling would be
systematic across all lineages. However, we also calculated a Jeffreys interval for daily
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variant frequencies and used the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles to compute R t and improve
the robustness of our analysis (Supplementary Fig. 2).
In New Haven County, our Rt estimates for B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* followed similar
decreasing trajectories as COVID-19 vaccination rates increased, though B.1.1.7
consistently had a higher Rt (Fig 2b). The Rt for both B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* were above 1
between March 4, when our estimates began, and the end of April, when fully vaccinated
rates reached ~25%. An Rt value above 1 indicates that on average an infected individual
infects more than one additional person. The Rt estimates for ‘other’ lineages fell below 1
in early January. Notably, the Rt for B.1.526* decreased to below 1 about one week earlier
than that for B.1.1.7 (Fig. 2b). To directly compare the transmissibility of B.1.1.7 and
B.1.526*, we calculated the ratio of Rt for each lineage over time (Fig. 2c). Once our
estimates stabilized at the end of March, the Rt of B.1.1.7 was consistently higher than
that of B.1.526* (range: 1.057-1.10). These findings indicate that B.1.1.7 was
approximately 6-10% more transmissible than B.1.526* when both variants circulated
concurrently in the same population. The ratio of R t estimates calculated using the lower
and upper quantiles of our Jeffreys intervals also exhibited this pattern (Supplementary
Fig. 2). We observed a similar relationship in New York City, though with larger
fluctuations (range: 1.02-1.29). The consistency of these findings suggests that B.1.1.7
was more transmissible than B.1.526* even when B.1.526* emerged before B.1.1.7.
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Figure 2: B.1.1.7 had a larger effective reproduction number (R t) than B.1.526 during
the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. (a, d) Daily incidence and full vaccination rates (2
weeks post last dose) of B.1.1.7, B.1.526*, and other circulating lineages in New Haven
County (a) and New York City (d). Daily cases were assigned to one of three lineage
categories (‘B.1.1.7’, ‘B.1.526*’, and ‘other’) according to the 7-day rolling average of
variant frequency among sequenced cases. ‘B.1.526*’ includes the sublineages B.1.526,
B.1.526.1, and B.1.526.2. (b, e) Time-varying effective reproduction numbers (R t) were
calculated using the R package epiEstim. An Rt value above 1 indicates that an infected
individual will, on average, infect more than 1 additional person. We assumed a serial
interval of mean 5.2 days and standard deviation of 4 days for all lineages. We used a
smoothing spline to smooth the daily R t curves (line) with the package, stat in R v4.0.1.
Non-smoothed estimates are shown as individual points. 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles are
shown as dotted lines (c, f) Ratios of estimated Rt between March 4 and May 4, 2021
calculated using the splines shown in (b) and (e).
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Association of B.1.1.7 introductions with larger phylogenetic clusters than B.1.526*
introductions
We next considered the possibility that the apparent increased transmissibility of
B.1.1.7 compared to B.1.526* was due to the number and timing of the introductions of
each variant into Connecticut. More frequent introductions of B.1.1.7 could artificially
inflate our Rt estimates (Fig. 2). To assess this possibility, we used a Bayesian
phylogeographic method to quantify the number, timing, and source of observed
introductions of both variants into Connecticut (Fig. 3). We found that while B.1.1.7 was
not introduced more often into the state than B.1.526*, rather the clusters resulting from
each introduction were on average larger than those produced by B.1.526* introductions.
These observations are in agreement with our epidemiological findings and further support
the likelihood that B.1.1.7 spread more rapidly than B.1.526*.
To begin our phylogeographic analysis, we combined our SARS-CoV-2 genomic
data with randomly sampled publicly available B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* genomes (gisaid.org)
from outside of Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, normalizing by reported deaths
per location (see Methods). We did this independently 5 times for each variant to account
for any potential biases from the subsampling process (~17,000 and ~13,000 genomes
for each B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* subsample, respectively; Supplementary Table 2), and
constructed the ten, corresponding time-resolved trees with TreeTime 20. We next
performed discrete phylogeographic reconstruction over the time-resolved trees in
BEAST21,22. We inferred the ancestral geographic states according to four discrete
geographic categories: Connecticut, New York/New Jersey, domestic, and international.
We chose to combine New York and New Jersey into one region because of the large
volume of commuters and visitors who travel from northern New Jersey to New York City.
Due to the notably different geographic distribution of these two variants (Fig.
3a,b), we expected the source of introductions for each to also differ. Because B.1.526*
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was first identified in New York and the majority of genomes from this variant family were
sequenced in New York, we hypothesized New York would be the main source of B.1.526*
introductions into Connecticut. B.1.1.7 spread widely in the United Kingdom and Europe,
and the first case of B.1.1.7 in Connecticut was associated with international travel 23,
indicating that early introduction would likely come from international sources. We
anticipated that international sources would drive the initial introductions of B.1.1.7 into
Connecticut until this variant was established in the US.
We found that the sources and size of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* sustained introductions
differed between variants and throughout the study period (Fig. 3c-e). We defined a
sustained introduction as a transition from a location outside of Connecticut into
Connecticut in which (1) the resulting clade contained at least 3 tips and (2) the posterior
probability of the ancestral, outside-Connecticut node was at least 0.7. As we expected,
New York/New Jersey was a main source of introductions of B.1.526* into Connecticut,
accounting for all but one of the 40 independent introductions (Fig. 3c-e). The sources of
introductions of B.1.1.7 were heterogeneous, including international and domestic sources
throughout the study period (Fig. 3c-e). The relatively limited role of New York/New Jersey
in the spread of B.1.1.7 into Connecticut may be due to the lower prevalence of this variant
in New York City for the majority of our study period (Fig. 1c). Our phylogeographic
analysis also revealed that although B.1.1.7 was introduced slightly less frequently than
B.1.526* (Fig. 3d), B.1.1.7 introductions led to larger clusters (Fig. 3e). These patterns
were consistent across all five phylodynamic replicates and with our estimates of R t
suggesting that B.1.1.7 has a fitness advantage over B.1.526* (Supplementary Fig. 3,
Fig. 2c).
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Figure 3: B.1.1.7 was introduced into Connecticut at a similar frequency as B.1.526*
but was associated with larger cluster sizes. (a, b) Discrete phylogeography of B.1.1.7
(a) and B.1.526* (b). Tips and nodes were assigned one of four possible locations:
Connecticut, New York/New Jersey, domestic, and international. The phylogeographic
analysis was performed in BEAST21 using a time-resolved tree as the fixed topology 22.
Bootstrap values for each clade are shown at each ancestral node (right) and were
obtained by constructing individual maximum likelihood trees with 1000 ultrafast
bootstraps in IQTree24. Clades without a support value were part of polytomies. (c) We
summed the number of sustained introductions for each variant by week. We defined
sustained introductions as Connecticut-only clades containing at least 3 tips related by a
non-Connecticut ancestor with at least 0.7 posterior probability for the inferred location.
Bar colors indicate the source of introduction. (d) There were more sustained introductions
of B.1.526* than B.1.1.7 into Connecticut. (e) The size of B.1.1.7 clades in Connecticut
was on average larger than B.1.526* clades in Connecticut. We calculated the log 10 size
of Connecticut clades shown in (a) and (b). The horizontal line denotes the median log
cluster size.
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DISCUSSION
In this study, we developed and implemented a novel framework that combines
epidemiological and genomic data to quantify the relative fitness of SARS-CoV-2 variants
of public health significance. This framework, which measures changes in frequencies and
estimates the effective reproduction number for individual variants, can be used to monitor
the epidemiological dynamics of variants. Our approach is more informative than the
current practice of tracking variant prevalence because it accounts for both the change in
lineage frequencies and the number of incident cases. We demonstrated the utility of our
framework by applying it to the dynamics of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* in Connecticut. In doing
so, we found that while both B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* likely had a fitness advantage over other
lineages (Fig. 1), B.1.1.7 was 6-10% more transmissible than B.1.526* (Fig. 2). Notably,
the transmissibility of B.1.1.7 decreased at a slower rate than that of B.1.526* as COVID19 vaccination rates increased (Fig. 2). These conclusions were consistent with those of
our phylogeographic analysis (Fig. 3), the typical albeit more computationally-intensive
method for evaluating the dynamics of virus transmission and spread.
Our framework facilitates the continual monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 variant
epidemiology across different settings, which is critical for informing public health policy
decisions that must be made with readily available data. We also used our framework to
analyze the dynamics of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* in New York City, where both variants also
co-circulated. Our results were consistent with those from Connecticut (Fig. 2) but had
some discrepancies with previous reports of relative growth rates in New York City.
Specifically, West et al. reported that B.1.526 with the spike E484K substitution was
growing at a faster rate than B.1.1.7 in New York City between December 2020 and March
202112. We also observed this rapid rise in B.1.526* prevalence during that time period
(Fig. 1d); however, we found that the growth rate of B.1.526* slowed shortly thereafter
(Fig. 1d), and B.1.1.7 became the dominant circulating lineage in April (Fig. 1c).
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Moreover, we estimated that the effective reproduction number of B.1.1.7 was equal to or
greater than that of B.1.526* by February (Fig. 2e), an early indicator of the eventual rise
in B.1.1.7 prevalence a few months later. This second finding is particularly crucial
because it illustrates that while variant frequencies at specific time points may not be
indicative of variant fitness, the changes in these frequencies can reveal relative variant
transmission dynamics when combined with daily incidence data. Therefore, our
framework can be used to accurately compare the fitness of competing variants soon after
they emerge.
The epidemiological findings from our case study also have broader public health
implications as new SARS-CoV-2 variants continue to emerge worldwide. The sources of
introductions of novel variants reflect their global distribution (Fig. 3a-c), which will likely
change over time. This heterogeneity poses a serious obstacle to control and prevention
efforts because it limits the efficacy of policies that target specific points of entry. For
variants that are prevalent on multiple continents like B.1.1.7 and, more recently,
B.1.617.2 (‘delta’), testing, contact tracing, and vaccination campaigns within communities
will likely prove more efficient in limiting their spread than targeting a specific subset of
travelers. Once local transmission of a new variant has been established, assessing the
public health threat is both challenging and necessarily retrospective. However, a robust
genomic surveillance infrastructure coupled with the application of our framework would
enable the monitoring of variant epidemiology in close to real time. The phylodynamic
methods we applied in this study can be run on a desktop computer in a few hours, making
the collation of representative datasets the rate limiting step. Expanding genomic
surveillance efforts would remove this barrier and promote a rapid and efficient response
to outbreaks caused by new variants.
There were some limitations to the epidemiological findings we have presented.
First, we were not able to directly measure the secondary attack rates of individuals
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infected with B.1.1.7 or one of the B.1.526* sublineages. Collecting this information
requires extensive contact tracing and sequencing of all secondary infections that are not
available in Connecticut. Instead, we assumed that biases introduced by the method we
employed in this study would be systematic across SARS-CoV-2 lineages so that
estimates of the relative transmissibility of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* would be unaffected.
Second, we used a small subset of publicly available SARS-CoV-2 genomes for our
phylodynamic analyses to make them computationally tractable. Incorporating a small
proportion of available data into our analyses may have introduced biases, but by
demonstrating the

reproducibility of our

findings with

independent replicates

(Supplemental Fig. 3), we substantially mitigated this issue. Finally, the scope of our
study was limited to Connecticut and, in some cases, New York City, which may impinge
upon the generalizability of our findings. However, our objective was to directly compare
the fitness of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526*, and Connecticut is one of few locations with a robust
genomic surveillance infrastructure where these variants emerged concurrently.
Here, we present a framework that uses genomic data to estimate the effective
reproduction number of individual virus lineages as a measure of relative transmission
and fitness. In applying our framework to Connecticut, this study is the first to directly
compare the fitness of B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* in a setting where they emerged concurrently.
Moreover, our findings highlight that many factors influence a variant’s success including
the timing of introduction, the existing virus population, host immunity, and advantageous
amino acid substitutions. As new SARS-CoV-2 variants emerge, it will be critical to assess
the magnitude of the role that each of these elements play in precipitating local outbreaks
so that appropriate, effective, and immediate steps may be taken to control further SARSCoV-2 transmission.
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METHODS
Ethics
Yale University
The Institutional Review Board from the Yale University Human Research Protection
Program determined that the RT-qPCR testing and sequencing of de-identified remnant
COVID-19 clinical samples obtained from clinical partners conducted in this study is not
research involving human subjects (IRB Protocol ID: 2000028599).

Jackson Laboratory
The Institutional Review Board of The Jackson Laboratory determined that use of deidentified residual COVID-19 clinical samples obtained from the Clinical Genomics
Laboratory for RT-qPCR testing and sequencing for this study is not research involving
human subjects (IRB Determination: 2020-NHSR-021).
New York State Department of Health, Wadsworth Center
Residual portions of respiratory specimens from individuals who tested positive for SARSCoV-2 by RT-PCR were obtained from the Wadsworth Center and partnering clinical
laboratories. This work was approved by the New York State Department of Health
Institutional Review Board, under study numbers 02-054 and 07-022.

Reported COVID-19 case data
We used daily reported cases compiled by the Johns Hopkins COVID-19 portal
(https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19). We summed the number of incident
cases by week by state for Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and
Connecticut, and we aggregated incident cases by week by county for New Haven,
Fairfield, and Westchester. We visualized these data using Prism v.9.0.2 (plots) and
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Rv.1.2 (maps). For the latter, we obtained the shapefiles from the United States Census
Bureau (east coast) and the Connecticut Department of Energy & Environmental
Protection (DEEP) Geographic Information Systems Open Data Website (Connecticut).

SARS-CoV-2 sequencing and consensus generation
Yale University
We received clinical samples from confirmed SARS-CoV-2 positive individuals
from routine testing provided by Yale New Haven Hospital, Yale Pathology Laboratory,
“Yale Campus Study”, Connecticut Department of Public Health, and Murphy Medical
Associates. These samples were sent as either nasal swabs in viral transport media, raw
saliva, or extracted and purified RNA. For the former two, we extracted RNA from 300µL
of the original sample using the MagMAX viral/pathogen nucleic acid isolation kit, eluting
in 75µl of elution buffer. We tested the extracted nucleic acid using our ‘variant of concern’
RT-qPCR assay to determine the SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA load

25

. Samples with cycle

thresholds <35 were prepared for sequencing using the Illumina COVIDSeq Test RUO
version to synthesize cDNA, and generate and tagment amplicons. Amplicons were
pooled and cleaned before quantification with Qubit High Sensitivity dsDNA kit. The
resulting libraries were sequenced using a 2x100 or 2x150 approach on an Illumina
NovaSeq at the Yale Center for Genomic Analysis. Each sample was given at least 1
million reads. Samples were typically processed in sets of 94 with negative controls
incorporated during the RNA extraction, cDNA synthesis, and amplicon generation steps.
Using BWA-MEM v.0.7.1526, we aligned reads to the Wuhan-Hu-1 reference
genomes (GenBank MN908937.3). With iVar v1.2.1 27 and SAMtools28, we trimmed
sequencing adaptors, masked primer sequences, and called bases by simple majority
(>50% frequency) at each site to generate consensus genomes. An ambiguous ‘N’ was
used when fewer than 10 reads were present at a site. In all cases, negative controls were
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analyzed and confirmed to consist of at least 95% Ns. We used pangolin v.2.4.2 29 to
assign lineages19.

Jackson Laboratory
Clinical samples were received in The Jackson Laboratory Clinical Genomics Laboratory
(CGL) as part of a statewide COVID-19 surveillance program, with the majority of samples
representing asymptomatic screening of nursing home and assisted living facility residents
and staff. Total nucleic acids were extracted from anterior nares swabs in viral transport
media or saline (200µL) using the MagMAX Viral RNA Isolation kit (ThermoFisher) on a
KingFisher Flex purification system. Samples were tested for the presence of SARS-CoV2 RNA using the TaqPath COVID-19 Combo Kit (ThermoFisher). Samples with cycle
thresholds ≤30 for the N gene target were prepared for sequencing using the Illumina
COVIDSeq Test kit. Sequencing was performed on an Illumina NovaSeq or NextSeq in
the CGL. Data analysis was performed using the DRAGEN COVID Lineage App in
BaseSpace Sequence Hub. Sequences with >80% of bases with non-N basecalls and
≥1500-fold median coverage were considered successful and were submitted to GISAID.
Lineages were assigned using pangolin v.2.4.229 and the most current version of the
pangoLEARN assignment algorithm.

New York State Department of Health, Wadsworth Center
Respiratory swabs positive for SARS-CoV-2 were sent to the Wadsworth Center from
collaborating clinical laboratories across New York State as part of an enhanced genomic
surveillance program initiated by the New York State Department of Health in December
2020. Specimens were required to have a real-time cycle threshold value less than 30.
Nucleic acid extraction was performed on a Roche MagNAPure 96 (Roche, Indianapolis,
IN) and RNA was processed for whole genome sequencing with a modified ARTIC3
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protocol (http://artic.network/ncov-2019) in the Applied Genomics Technology Core at the
Wadsworth Center, as previously described 10. Lineage was determined by GISAID using
pangolin software 29, updated June 7, 2021. Daily relative frequency of variants within New
York City was determined based on sample collection date and patient residence within
Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, or Richmond counties. Any specimens that were
sequenced as a result of pre-screening for specific mutations or clinical/epidemiological
criteria were removed from the analysis.

Percent of COVID-19 cases sequenced
To calculate the percent of cases sequenced in each county, we tabulated the number of
genomes collected from the state with available county-level data. Though this level of
geographic resolution was only available for genomes sequenced by our laboratory and
the Jackson Laboratory for Genomic Medicine, these two sources have generated the
vast majority of genomes for the state of Connecticut. For New York City, NY, we used
genomes generated by the Wadsworth Center. Using the case data described above, we
summed the number of cases reported by each county between November 30, 2020 and
May 9, 2021, and divided the total number of genomes generated for each county within
the same timeframe by that sum.

Frequency of SARS-CoV-2 variants among sequenced cases
To assess the frequency of circulating lineages, we selected genomes that were
sequenced through a non-biased sampling approach. Specifically, we excluded genomes
that were screened and sequenced through a targeted S-gene target failure surveillance
system. As with the dataset we used to measure the percent of cases sequenced by
county, these genomes were generated by our laboratory, Jackson Laboratory, and the
Wadsworth Center. We organized these genomes into three categories using Pangolin
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v.2.4.229: B.1.1.7, B.1.1526*, and ‘other’. We then tabulated the number of genomes in
each category by week and calculated the percent of the total number of genomes for that
week.

Distribution of SARS-CoV-2 variants among cases
We obtained estimates of the distribution of cases attributed to each lineage
category by multiplying the frequency of that category by the number of cases reported in
the same week. In doing so, we assumed that the sequencing frequencies described
above were representative of the virus population circulating in New Haven and Fairfield
counties, and New York City (all counties). We also assumed that the number of reported
cases for each county was representative of the true number of infections in that region.
To account for any uncertainty in our assumption that the sampling frequencies
were representative of cases per county, we began by calculating p, a 7-day rolling
average for the proportion of sequenced cases for each lineage category. This produced
daily proportion estimates. To further account for any uncertainty, for each p, we
calculated a Jeffreys interval, which is a Bayesian, equal-tailed interval of the form30:
2.5 quantile: β(x + 0.5, n - x + 0.5)
97.5 quantile: β(x + 0.5, n - x + 0.5)
where β represents the beta distribution, x represents the 7-day rolling average of
sequences of a specific lineage, and n represents the 7-day rolling average of sequences
for all lineages. Our measure of interest, p, is calculated by x/n. The Jeffreys intervals
were calculated using the package “DescTools” in R v4.0.1.

Logistic regression
We computed logistic growth models for each lineage category in each county using the
frequency estimates described above.
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Effective reproduction number
Using p, and the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles from the Jeffreys interval, we multiplied these
values by the number of reported cases per day. These three potential case counts were
used to calculate the reproduction number (Rt), the mean number of secondary cases
generated by a typical primary case at time t in a population, curves per lineage
(Supplementary Fig. 2). Because there is no consensus in the literature as to the precise
serial interval for each variant, we used an uncertain serial interval with mean of 5.2 days
and standard deviation of 4 days31–33. Through the uncertain serial interval, multiple
distributions were explored where the mean was allowed to vary from 2.2 to 8.2 days, and
the standard deviation varied from 2.5 to 5.5 days. From each of these R t distributions, we
selected the mean Rt to represent a given lineage’s instantaneous effective reproductive
number per day. Further, for the Rt distribution calculated from p, we also computed the
0.025 and 0.975 quantiles (Supplementary Fig. 2). All of the Rt estimates were calculated
using the “EpiEstim” package in R v4.0.1. Finally, we used a smoothing spline to smooth
the daily Rt curves with the package “stat” in R v4.0.1.

COVID-19 vaccination rates
We obtained vaccination data for New York City from data.cdc.gov and for Connecticut
from data.ct.gov (COVID-19 Vaccinations by Town and Age Group).

SARS-CoV-2 genome selection for phylogenetic analysis
We downsampled both B.1.1.7 and B.1.526* datasets using COVID-19 death
counts. We elected to normalize genome counts to the number of deaths because deaths
are less likely to be under-reported than cases34. We obtained daily death counts for all
countries

and

US

states

from

the
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Johns

Hopkins

COVID-19

portal

(https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19). We summed the cumulative number of
deaths for each state or country between October 1, 2020 and April 23, 2021 because we
assumed that deaths could not be attributed to either variant before October 1. Because
country-level death data were not reported for countries within the UK, we calculated the
total number of genomes to sample from the UK with the method described above, and
then calculated the distribution of genomes by UK country based on population size. To
calculate the number of genomes we would include in our final datasets from each region,
we first calculated the ratio of variant genomes to deaths. In doing so, we assumed that
the number of variant genomes sequenced by each country or state was proportional to
the total number of genomes sequenced in those places.
For non-US sampling, if the number of variant genomes sequenced comprised
less than 1% of cumulative deaths, we included all of the genomes from that location.
Otherwise, we selected the number of genomes that corresponded to 1% of reported
cumulative deaths. We used a similar approach for US states except we set the minimum
threshold to 0.1% of cumulative deaths. In all cases, if a country or state had less than 20
genomes available, we included all of them. For the B.1.526* lineages, we calculated the
proportion of each lineage out of the total number of B.1.526* genomes sequenced in
each country or state and selected genomes according to this proportion.
We did not downsample Connecticut, New York, or New Jersey for either variant
dataset in the first stage of downsampling. Once functional duplicates were removed from
these locations, we included 1,408 genomes sequenced by Yale (Connecticut), 497
sequenced by Jackson Laboratory (Connecticut), and 803 sequenced by the Wadsworth
Center (New York City) collected between December 1, 2020 and April 23, 2021. We
obtained all other genomes for this analysis from GISAID (gisaid.org) (Supplementary
Table 2, 3). We also applied a modified sampling scheme for B.1.1.7 genomes from
Australia, New Zealand, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Vietnam, or Singapore because these
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locations reported a negligible number of deaths. For this reason, it was impossible to
downsample based on the number of reported deaths. We therefore randomly selected
1% of available genomes from those locations instead. To select the genomes to
incorporate into our dataset from the downsampled locations, we randomly selected a
weekly set of genomes equal to 1% of deaths per week. Using this workflow, we generated
five datasets for each variant to serve as independent replicates for the remainder of our
analysis (Table 1). In all cases, we excluded genomes containing more than 30% Ns from
our selection. Due to the broader global distribution of B.1.1.7, the datasets for this variant
were necessarily larger than those for B.1.526*.
At that stage, the datasets were still too large to be computationally tractable. We
next scaled each dataset by a factor of 0.1 by randomly selecting 10% of genomes by
country or state (US only). We did not scale genomes from Connecticut so that the final
datasets were not precisely one tenth the size of the original (Supplementary Table 2).

SARS-CoV-2 phylogenetic analysis
Sequence alignment and refinement
Having compiled our ten datasets, we aligned the genomes using MAFFT 35. We then
removed gaps and masked problematic sites36. We then removed functional duplicates
from each dataset to reduce phylogenetic redundancy. We defined a functional duplicate
as genomes that shared identical sequences, week of collection, and geographic region.
For genomes collected in Connecticut and New York, we defined the geographic region
as the county. For genomes collected elsewhere in the US, we defined it as ‘state’. For
genomes collected internationally, we defined the geographic region as ‘country’.

Maximum likelihood construction
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To identify and remove problematic genomes from our datasets, we performed a
preliminary phylogenetic analysis in IQTree 24. Each tree was rooted using a P.1 genome
(hCoV-19/Brazi/AM-FIOCRUZ-20842882CA/2020). We performed a root-to-tip analysis in
TempEST37 and removed outliers with residuals > |0.0015|. We constructed a maximum
likelihood tree with each dataset (n = 10) using a GTR substitution model with 1000
ultrafast bootstraps again with IQTree.

Time-resolved construction
To avoid computational bottlenecks in our phylogeographic reconstruction, we did not use
a Bayesian method to infer the temporal resolution of our maximum likelihood tree. We
have previously shown that temporal estimates inferred using TreeTime agree with those
inferred from BEAST for B.1.1.7 10, and we assumed this would also be the case for
B.1.526*. We used the bootstrapped trees and associated alignments to construct
corresponding time-resolved phylogenetic trees with TreeTime v.0.8.0 20. This method is
implemented in an augur pipeline 38.

Discrete phylogeographic analysis
We performed a discrete phylogeographic analysis with the time-resolved trees as
the fixed topology using BEAST21,22. Specifically, we assigned a location to each of the
tree tips from four categories: ‘Connecticut’, ‘New York/New Jersey’, ‘domestic’, and
‘international’. We used an asymmetric substitution model and a strict clock to model
location. We ran each tree for 1 million chains and used Tracer v.1.7.1 to confirm that all
parameters had achieved ESS values of at least 200.
We identified Connecticut-only clades and their source of introduction using the
“exploded tree” script implemented with baltic 0.1.6 (https://github.com/evogytis/baltic).
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We restricted our subsequent analysis to clades that represented sustained introductions,
or clades that were composed of at least 3 tips that were related by a non-Connecticut
ancestor with at least 0.7 posterior probability for the inferred location. We aggregated the
number of sustained introductions by week and source, and visualized the results using
Prism v.9.0.2. We merged the bootstrap values from our original trees with the topology
of our geographically-resolved trees using baltic.
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SUPPLEMENT

Supplementary Figure 1: Complex phylogenetic topology and synchronous
epidemiology of B.1.526* sublineages in Connecticut. (a) Maximum likelihood
phylogenetic tree of B.1.526* sublineages built using Nexstrain (nextstrain.org). (b)
Normalized frequencies of B.1.526* sublineages based on 1,011 publicly available whole
genomes sampled in Connecticut.
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Supplementary Table 1: Distribution of ‘other’ lineages in Connecticut sequenced
between November 30, 2020 and May 9, 2021. Current genomic surveillance data for
Connecticut are available at https://covidtrackerct.com. Variants of Concern are shown in
red and Variants of Interest are shown in blue (based on CDC classifications as of June
10, 2021).
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Supplementary Figure 2: Effective reproduction number (Rt) estimates for circulating
variants using lower and upper Jeffreys intervals (0.025 and 0.975 quantiles,
respectively).
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Supplementary Table 2: Size of replicate datasets
B.1.1.7

B.1.526*

rep.

Downsampled (functional
duplicates removed)

Outliers
removed

Scaled by
0.1x

Downsampled (functional
duplicates removed)

Outliers
removed

Scaled by
0.1x

1

17,897

17,877

2,970

12,836

12,830

1,726

2

17,939

17,916

2,975

12,840

12,829

1,706

3

17,959

17,937

3,194

12,837

12,825

1,717

4

17,922

17,902

2,970

12,838

12,829

1,704

5

17,927

17,907

2,979

12,835

12,824

1,713
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Supplementary Figure 3: Discrete phylogeographic results for downsampled
replicates. (a, b) Number of introductions by week for B.1.1.7 (a) and B.1.526*. (c,d)
Summary of number and mean size of introductions for B.1.1.7 (c) and B.1.526* (d)
replicates.
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